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HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM LEGAL TRANSPLANTS TO 
FAIR TRANSLATION 
JAMES M. DONOVAN* 
ABSTRACT 
The current regime of international human rights suffers from 
three shortcomings: First, it has failed to adequately address the reality of 
cultural diversity. Second, the formalized human rights treaties have 
been ineffective in their ability to compel states to reform their 
behaviors, and third, the uncontrolled growth in the number of human 
rights weakens the impact of appeals to that standard. 
Although treated as independent problems, this paper finds that 
these three limitations are sufficiently linked such that a remedy to the 
first will simultaneously resolve the others. Parts I and II of the paper 
describe how the imposition of human rights values onto some societies 
...... ma.;; iutlii;t11niuJ~nd£) . .d. bmmsJQJbi;; .~~.t~nt.1b.a1 .. .thP§~ agtiQus .... JJJ19&nuim:< ... 
the justification and support for human rights altogether. Against that 
background is the challenge to find ways to realize the goods of the 
human rights project without injuring those it intends to benefit. 
Drawing extensively upon multiple disciplines-most notably 
the philosophical exchange between Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron, 
and the methodological suggestions of Alison Dundes Renteln and 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im-the article focuses on linking human 
rights laws with local values. The result should be human rights 
expressed in a manner in which all peoples can see themselves. If they 
are no longer viewed as hegemonic intrusions, human rights will be 
openly recognized and consequently more successfully observed. 
Finally, the structural limitations of the suggested procedure will 
necessarily support only a small number of human rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
··· 11umaii rtglrts presl~ITtlworelrrted pmb'lems:· Frrst;·from·arrirritial ···· · · 
declaration in 1948, the number of formally identified as well as 
informally claimed rights increases every year. 1 Framing all conflicts 
through the vocabulary of human rights diminishes the vitality of other 
forms of normative social regulation. When eveiything becomes a 
question of law, the utility of custom, religion, and even etiquette, as well 
as the ties of family and community, cease to play a meaningful role in 
the organization of human societies. That price might be acceptable if 
invocations of human rights achieved their goal of creating a better 
world, with fewer abuses by states of their citizens than would otherwise 
be the case. This result, however, has been questioned. 
Although writers have remarked on the overuse of rights in 
general and human rights in particular, their concerns have been 
primarily normative, and thus fail to offer principled direction on how 
this condition should be improved. Realizing that the overabundance of 
human rights can lead to their reduced effectiveness is one thing, but it is 
quite another to identify a reasoned manner by which to restrict their 
number. Instead, ad hoc arguments defend why a particular proposal 
1 See infra Section LB. 
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should be rejected, without providing a generalized limitation on the 
members of the class of human rights. 
Only part of the ambivalence toward human rights endeavors 
flows from their increasing mundanity. Claimed violations fail to trigger 
the desired responses also because the recognized human rights do not 
respect the diversity of values within the world's cultures.2 Rather than 
being the rights of humans qua humans, in practice the human rights can 
be perceived as the ideals of Westerners projected outward as hegemonic 
demands upon subordinate Others,3 "an updated version of the civilizing 
mission of Western imperialists. "4 
Any revisions to the human rights legal regime are certain to 
meet strong resistance. The language of contemporary human rights 
pervades modern societies to the extent that it has been called a "secular 
religion. "5 The label has become a ubiquitous shmihand for an ideal of 
personal security and actualization that is not likely to immediately 
disappear. 
Taking the human rights regime with its acknowledged faults as 
a persistent reality, this paper considers how it can be amended to better 
achieve its promise to effectively guarantee core rights to all persons 
.?witheHtre€J.uil,iagthey·sunen4ei: .. what.th@y····beLie¥<3·mak@s.them·humarh······ 
The discussion asserts that the shmicomings of the current human rights 
approach-too many, too parochial, too ineffective-are linked. A 
method that better identifies norms that truly warrant the label human is 
likely to yield a well-defined and limited roster of human rights. Less 
frequent invocation may make the rights more powerful for being rare 
2 This discussion treats "human rights," which refers to a generalized idea of a species of civilian 
protections, as distinct from "the human rights," which refers to the pragmatic list of legally 
recognized rights. That the two labels reference different concepts can be seen in the diverging 
answers they receive in question form. "What are human rights?" invokes broad foundations of 
human dignity and personal value, while "What are the human rights?" produces a list of specific 
entitlements enumerated in ratified documents. 
3 References to "the Other" tie into an extended tradition in sociology, philosophy, and political 
geography wherein notions of the Self are defined and justified by contrast to an inferior Other. 
See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 6 (Vintage, 2011) ("The category of Other is 
as original as consciousness itself."). See also DEREK GREGORY, THE COLONIAL PRESENT: 
AFGHANISTAN, PALESTINE, IRAQ 48 (2004) ("During the 2000 presidential election campaign, 
Bush had recalled growing up in a world where there was no doubt about the identity of 
America's 'Other."'). 
4 ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 68 (2014). 
5 CHRISTOPHER NJ. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2015). 
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and uncontroversial, and perhaps thereby more effective. The following 
sections propose such a method. 
This paper begins with a review of the problem that must be 
solved (Part I), as well as a critique of the cunent legal regime's 
shortcomings regarding the value of human diversity (Part II). The 
central premise is that if the idea of the human right is to do the work we 
require, there needs to be a better procedure to recognize them. If they 
are what they claim to be, human rights, their identification should spark 
consensual recognition at some level by the widest range of human 
societies. Otherwise, human rights will be human only in the hyperbolic 
marketing sense that the "World Series" selects the planet's best baseball 
teams or that "Miss Universe" chooses the most attractive woman in all 
creation. 
Part III draws upon the literature of legal anthropology and other 
disciplines to describe methodologies designed to respect human 
diversity. These techniques pinpoint the substantive content of human 
rights by building upon the empirically identified moral tenets of a wide 
range of societies. Such an approach views human rights as a conclusion 
from observed cultural ideals rather than an abstracted aspiration that 
.. s.elec.tiv:ely.T .. punishes .• so.me.groups ..•. who .... Jail ... .to .... ac.hieYe.thos.e ... imposed ....... . 
goals. 
The goal is that, in order to be relevant at the ground level, 
human rights should be broadly convergent with the underlying values of 
any successful group. There need not be one-to-one isomorphism, and 
the indigenously recognized principle may need restatement into modern 
legal statements. The end result, however, should be sensible to any 
population. The alternative is that, instead of a translation of local 
principles into a consistent language of international law, we witness a 
power-based transplant of foreign obligations upon subordinate peoples. 
Today, this grounded approach to human rights finds little 
support among relevant policy brokers. One reason for the lack of uptake 
may be that a critical piece of the description has been missing. 
Negotiations that would smooth conflicts between disparate factions 
within each society and between societies that have reached different 
conclusions concerning appropriate norms cannot progress without an 
independent standard to evaluate competing claims. Without a mutually 
acceptable benchmark, no side can reasonably argue its position is better 
than another. With little incentive for either side to yield in an argument 
over fundamental principles, impasses are inevitable. To fill this gap, 
Part IV proposes that panhuman intuitions about basic fairness can 
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function as a shared prior ethical commitment, assisting in the resolution 
of disagreements concerning the substantive content of human rights. 
The rights identified by the criterion of cross-cultural recognition 
will be few in number and phrased to protect against abuses rather than 
aspire towards ideals. While these restrictions have independent merit to 
prevent diluting overuse from the invocation of new and controversial 
rights, the applied technique generates the desired result through a 
nonarbitrary means. 
I. CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 
Experts may prefer an ostensive definition that defines "human 
rights" by pointing to clear exemplars, a method that limits the category 
to the rights in relevant legal documents. Frankly, human rights are 
whatever the United Nations determines. Most ordina1y speakers, 
however, employ a more natural approach that builds upon the meanings 
of the words themselves. Typical in this regard is the definition offered 
by philosopher Richard Wasserstrom: 
If any right is a human right, it must, I believe, have at least four vety 
·· ·· · geiie1:ara1araeterEiffcs: fiil:sc·· ff ffiusF ·te !Jossessecf f:JY: arr llliffiail···· · ·· 
beings, as well as only by human beings. Second, because it is the 
same right that all human beings possess, it must be possessed 
equally by all human beings. Third, because human rights are 
possessed by all human beings, we can rnle out as possible candidates 
any of those rights which one might have in virtue of occupying any 
particular status or relationship, such as that of parent, president, or 
promisee. And fourth, if there are any human rights, they have the 
additional characteristic of being assertable, in a manner of speaking, 
'against the whole world.' That is to say, because they are rights that 
are not possessed in virtue of any contingent status or relationship, 
they are rights that can be claimed equally against any and every 
other human being.6 
By any definition, human rights shoulder an unenviable burden. 
This new legal creation emerged from the aftermath of the horrors of 
6 Symposium, Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination, 61 J. 
PHIL. 628, 631-32 (1964). Wasserstrom's definition varies only slightly from that given by the 
United Nations. See What Are Human Rights?, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues!Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) 
("Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of 
residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all 
equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, 
interdependent and indivisible."). 
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World War II. At the time they were committed, the Nazi atrocities were 
not technically illegal due to the norms of state sovereignty under the 
W estphalian international order. A state was generally permitted to treat 
its own citizens however it wished. 7 Human rights aspire to pierce this 
veil of state immunity from outside interventions by providing an 
unquestioned and unquestionable floor of protections for every citizen 
from ce1iain state actions. 
To be effective, human rights must be unchallenged in the broad 
strokes, with disagreement limited only to whether a contested action 
falls within the forbidden category. To create this impact, "universal 
human rights in their dominant register (i.e., the one expressed through 
instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]), 
are above politics, before culture, and, quite literally, outside ofhistory."8 
Against mandates of such authority a state could not, for example, asse1i 
a right to tmiure political prisoners by arguing that these individuals 
were criminals, not political prisoners, and that in any event they were 
being subjected only to "enhanced interrogation," and not torture.9 
Invocation of human rights serves as a shield against aggression 
by state actors, as hump in arguments against which no higher principle 
.. can.be ... imwked, .. and.as .. a .... bur.den:.shiftertbai.nut.s ... it .. JlP.QnJhe.QJh.er ... Par!y 
to defend its actions. Although legalistic line-drawing frays the 
protective cloak this jurisprudential creation throws around vulnerable 
persons, the outcome presumably results in a more tempered self-
restraint by governments than had previously been the case. 
One need not question whatever good has flowed from the 
international regime of human rights to notice that its benefits and 
burdens have not been evenly distributed. While marketed as a high 
standard for all, the contents appear to repackage values already held by 
some and then employed as a critical lash against others, rather than 
7 JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 28-29 (1993) ("International relations is 
structured around the legal fiction that states have exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, its 
occupants and resources, and the events that take place there."). 
8 Mark Goodale, The Power of Right(s): Tracking Empires of Law and New Modes of Social 
Resistance in Bolivia (and Elsewhere), in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW 
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 130, 144 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 
2007). 
9 E.g., Talal Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 111, 120 (Richard A. Wilson 
ed., 1997) ("[T]he many liberal-democratic governments that have employed torture have 
attempted to do so in secret. And sometimes they have been concerned to redefine legally the 
category of pain-producing treatment in an attempt to avoid the label 'tmture. '"). 
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applied to more local demands. As noted by one legal historian, under 
American exceptionalism human rights are openly looked upon as 
"export commodities-goods shipped off to others in faraway places, but 
rarely considered fit for domestic consumption." 10 
In the meantime, those in "faraway places" may not share the 
view that the demands being made are good or right, and may even think 
the opposite. While we may be conditioned to reflexively regard such 
pushback as ill-considered, its existence should cause us to pause and 
inquire how these norms came to have the content they do, and why they 
are labeled as "human" rights rather than civil or political rights. 11 When 
humans fail to recognize the relevance of human rights we tend to 
criticize the humans as barbarians or inhumane, when perhaps we should 
reconsider the latent messages of those proclaimed human rights. 
Before argument can be made that changes are required to our 
approach to human rights, the case must be made that a genuine problem 
exists. The following sections argue that even if we grant that the initial 
vision within the UDHR was sufficiently limited to the most general 
standards of acceptable restrictions on state actors, latter accretions 
impose ever more exacting demands that realize decreasing benefits . 
..... G;g11fliet .. hetwee&··thes0tep-dewn/draftingsBfergafil.z;ational·eemmittees· 
and the ground level lifeways of peoples has become unavoidable. 
Continuing on the present course will either result in the delegitimization 
of the human rights project altogether because it has expanded so far 
beyond its original purpose that it cannot bear the weight of dictating a 
broad suite of rules for a planet, or lead to nonnative homogeneity 
through the demise of alternative understandings of the goods of human 
living. 
10 ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 121. See also STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
97 (2013) (citing Louis Henkin) ("The American public was, by and large, a paying audience 
rather than a membership constituency for global rights. They rarely if ever sought international 
protection for domestic 'human rights' abuses, and this deeply nationalist conception of the 
civil/human rights distinction persists. Human rights were, in effect, foreign policy for non-
Americans. "). 
n Goodale reminds us of the qualitative difference between civil and human rights. MARK 
GOODALE, SURRENDERING TO UTOPIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 29-30 (2009) 
("[C]ivil rights were understood in a quite different way than human rights, within a different 
system of political and legal legitimacy, and anchored in a different set of assumptions about 
human nature and the foundation of citizenship."). 
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A. TOP-DOWN ORIGINS OF HR REGIM 
Human rights are a legal and philosophical chimera. To receive 
at least a formal show of submission they must appear to be in some 
sense antecedent to and superior to the sovereignty of nation-states. If 
that were not the case, any renegade state could with impunity declare 
itself exempt from whatever nonn against which it was currently chafing. 
Underneath the popular image of a supranational power lies a 
much messier reality. While giving the appearance of having been only 
recognized, human rights are, in fact, created. They are fonnal 
enactments of international law, hammered out over years of minute 
craftsmanship until a consensus document emerges that is in the end only 
selectively :ratified. As is true of most legislative instruments, the final 
compromise may only vaguely resemble the initial broad aspirational 
intent. Despite springing from this most artificial and contrived of 
processes, the outcome will nonetheless be proclaimed bearing the 
honorific of "human right." 
Little attention has been directed toward the significance of 
applying the label "human right." To the extent that the fulfillment of the 
......... Jc'.u.ie;.s .. o.bjectiv.es .... i:equi1:e.s ... noL .. only .... gov.ernmentaL .. compliance but .. als~1. 
uptake by the general population, calling an obligation a "human 
right"-:rather than "the latest demand for conformity issued out of 
Geneva or New York"-makes all the difference. Even when aware of 
the rule's artificial genesis, the lay audience relies upon the myth that the 
pronouncements embody natural entailments of being "human," which 
places them beyond the reach of contrary demands of mere politics or 
:religion. Once loosed, the human right cannot be contained and yields to 
no superior authority. For this reason, when the UDHR was being 
drafted, "the British Colonial Office warned its overseas administrators 
not to circulate the text of the UDHR, lest this brood of subversive ideas 
propagate in the streets before they could be tamed in the UN 
Commission." 12 Actual compliance with human rights obligations may 
be imperfect, but the branding makes it difficult for any state to deny 
utterly that it has at least some duties in those matters. 
This natural law mystique emboldens well-meaning actors who 
promulgate the legal mandates onto noncompliant groups. Tellingly, 
these peoples may have been unrepresented during committee 
negotiations that formulated the standards. Unlike the earlier torture 
12 ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 137. 
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example, they did not commit to the rules only to attempt to avoid them 
through legalistic hairsplitting; here they may not concede that the 
asserted rights are relevant to them, and may recognize the rule as being 
neither right nor consistent with their understanding of what it means to 
be "human." As a result, the fear is that: 
Instead of serving as a bulwark against fascism and the oppression of 
the weak, a declaration of human rights would, eventually, no matter 
how well intentioned, tend toward the opposite: it would become a 
doctrine "employed to implement economic exploitation and ... 
deny the right to control their own affairs to millions of people over 
the world, where the expansion of Europe and America has not 
[already] meant the literal extermination of whole populations." 13 
This divergence between the ennobling sweep of the popular imagination 
and the gritty particularities of group life presents the problem this article 
attempts to resolve. 
Critiquing the slippage between the marketing of human rights 
and their applications may appear to some as a false issue. The UDHR is 
an aspirational chaiier lacking legal force, serving only as a statement of 
principles, much like the role of the Declaration of Independence within 
. th.e jJui.spmdence.of.Jhe .... U.nite.d$tate.s ... No .. one . .is.Jikely.to .• b.e .. £.o1111a.ll:Y···· 
disciplined for failure to abide by the responsibilities with the UDHR. 14 
The burden to comply flows instead from the signed treaties which have 
at their center the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 15 Collectively known as the International Bill of Human Rights, 16 
13 GOODALE, supra note 11, at 28. 
14 MARK w. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (3d ed. 1999) ("Like other 
General Assembly resolutions, however, the Universal Declaration does not in and of itself 
constitute a binding international obligation, though it may be cited as an evidence of a 
customary international law of human rights, and some feel that by now it is itself part of 
customary international law."). 
15 The United Nations lists eighteen instruments as forming the "core" of international human 
rights. See The Core International Hu111an Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, 
U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Coreinstruments.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 
2017). The complete list of all human rights instruments is also available. See also Universal 
Hu111an Rights !nstrn111ents, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Universa!HumanRightsinstruments.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
16 UNITED NATIONS, FACT SHEET NO. 2 (REV. 1), THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(June 1996), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev. I en.pdf. 
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these documents and others operationalize the spirit captured within the 
UDHR. 
Difficulties come not from the general idea of human rights but 
with the attempt to fill the category with enforceable content. This is a 
weakness of all natural law systems. Whatever intuitive salience the 
notion offers that there is a basic order beyond our ability to either ignore 
or change with impunity, identifying universally agreeable tenets has 
proven obstinately difficult. The best guidance Thomas Aquinas could 
offer was "do good, avoid evil." 17 Lacking any film or consistent criteria 
to identify the rules of natural law, a common outcome is for the 
speaker's personal preferences to be elevated to universal principle. 
Similarly, the heady mixture of natural law justification with positive law 
enactments blurs the specific details about the category of human rights. 
Disagreement on the identification of human rights arises even 
within an international community that shares the same political and 
philosophical assumptions. The United States, for example, has declined 
to ratify the h'eaties that specify the human rights of women 18 and 
children, 19 and was one of only four nations to vote against the 2007 U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.20 Disputes over legal 
...... matters.are.notunc.ommon,.huLin.Jhis ... ius.tanceJhe .. la.ck.of cm1sensi1s .. l.iaP 
be uniquely damaging to the underlying assumptions. Human rights 
enjoy popular endorsement because they are thought to be obvious, even 
self-evident consequences of humanness. 21 Consistent rejection of 
17 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q. 94 a. 2 ("[G]ood ought to be done and pursued 
and that evil ought to be avoided."). 
18 See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, Ratification 
of 18 Intemational Human Rights Treaties, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2017) for the current status of ratification of human rights instruments. 
19 See id. to find the current status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
20 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
The three other states who voted against the Declaration-Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada-like the United States would find it inconvenient if they were compelled to recognize 
the rights of its colonized indigenes. 
21 The alleged self-evidency of the human rights raises several difficulties. "This claim of self-
evidence, crucial to human rights even now, gives rise to a paradox: if equality of rights is so 
self-evident, then why did this assertion have to [be] made and why was it only made in speci fie 
times and places?" LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 19 (2007). More to the 
point, were the rights truly self-evident, it should not be necessary to expend so many resources 
on teaching people to recognize them. However, "[t]he principles enunciated in the UN World 
Conference of Human Rights in June 1993 asserted ... the need for human rights education in a 
systematic way and on a massive scale." Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational 
Culture: The Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawaii, 1993, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
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enabling treaties by the most ardent advocates of human rights 
undermines that fa<;ade and threatens to lay bare their ultimately arbitra1y 
genesis. 
From one perspective, the UDHR and its progeny represent only 
the latest step in the formal articulation of rights which runs from the 
English Magna Carta (1215) through the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and ending with the American 
Bill of Rights (1791 ). What set the UDHR apart, however, was its 
intention to apply universally to eve1yone on the planet rather than to the 
members of a limited political collective. If shared background 
assumptions greatly eased those earlier efforts, allowing even 
slaveholders to speak unironically about the endowed rights of all men, 
the task becomes considerably more challenging when expanded to 
include viewpoints that radically differ on the understanding of the good 
of human life. When these discussions include perspectives beyond the 
modern states, the confusion and disagreement threaten to make the idea 
of a human right unsustainable. 
Fortunately, the ontological ambivalence that created this 
difficulty also offers an opening to discern a methodology identifying 
those.pxote.ctionsdesei¥ing .. thetitleof~.~huma11rights.:; .. 
B. HYPERTROPHY OF INEFFECTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 
Specific human rights are the product of positive law 
negotiations subsequently packaged as natural law entitlements. As a 
result of that process, requirements of human rights law can diverge from 
the norms of folk in two ways. First, the laws themselves may differ 
substantively from local norms because they each reflect distinctive 
assumptions about human nature. If human rights are intended to emerge 
out of what it means to be "human," then to the extent that those 
understandings differ, so too must the expectations of the rights that 
follow upon those premises. As John Evans recently demonstrated, when 
persons in American society hold dissimilar ideas about what it means to 
be human, the differences influence attitudes toward human rights.22 We 
CULTURE & CONTEXT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 28, 30--31 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 
1997). 
12 While Evans' contrasts hehveen philosophical, theological, and biological anthropologies suffice 
for present purposes to demonstrate that beliefs about what it means to be "human" yield 
different postures toward human rights, more specific conclusions are problematic. Among the 
methodological weaknesses of his project is the measure of attitudes toward human rights. He 
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can expect to find even more dramatic differences between groups that 
share significantly less in common. 
Even without the complications from divergent assumptions 
about humanness, conflicts can arise when fonnally enumerated human 
rights become more extensive. The illusion that human rights gesture 
toward universal entitlements might have been sustainable if human 
rights had been limited to the 1948 roster in the UDHR, a self-contained 
and presumptively unassailable pronouncement akin to the Decalogue. 
Unfo1iunately, later pronouncements both more specific and increasingly 
numerous have multiplied the opp01iunities for friction between legal 
rule and practical living. According to a tally offered by Eric Posner, the 
"number of human rights increased from 20 in 1975, to 100 in 1980, to 
offers five different scenarios- using US troops to stop genocide, buying a kidney, committing 
suicide to avoid incurable disease and expensive medical costs, taking blood from a condemned 
prisoner to cure cancer, and torturing terrorists to save lives- and asks respondents to rate the 
moral acceptability of each. JOHN H. EVANS, WHAT IS A HUMAN? WHAT THE ANSWERS MEAN 
FOR HUMAN RlGHTS 69 (2016). 
--- ---- "ffre-·surveyslmws ··thatthe·general· -depictions·assoeiated- with· the- biologiea l- and-philosophical --
anthropologies (that we are not special compared to animals, nonunique, of unequal value, with 
minds like machines) are associated with less support for specific human rights attitudes. Those 
associated with the theological anthropology are associated with more support for human rights 
attitudes. In general, those who agree more with the biological and philosophical anthropologies 
are less in agreement with human rights, and those who agree more with the theological are more 
in agreement with human rights. 
However, one can find something morally distasteful while still recognizing an underlying right, 
as when the ACLU fought to permit the Nazis to march through the predominantly Jewish 
community of Skokie, Illinois. Nat'! Socialist Party of Am. v. Vil!. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977). Such difficulties mean that the conclusion that the Darwinian view of humanness tends 
toward less tolerance for human rights should be offered with much caution. Even assuming that 
Evans has adequately operationalized attitudes toward human rights, the relationship he found 
may be an artefact of the specific issue involved, or the general background assumptions of the 
discussion. For example, at an earlier time the theological view, in light of the Genesis account 
of Noah, argued that black races were inferior and thus slavery and later Jim Crow were the 
appropriate responses. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. HAYNES, NOAH'S CURSE: THE BIBLICAL 
JUSTIFICATION OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 8 (2002) {"By the 1830s ... the scriptural defense of 
slavery had evolved into the 'most elaborate and systematic statement' ofproslavery theory."). It 
was the biological/scientific work of others like Franz Boas showing that all races are 
indistinguishable that dispelled the myth of the separation of races and made possible the equal 
treatment of persons. See FRANZ BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE (1940). See also 
Deborah L. Hall, David C. Matz, & Wendy Wood, Why Don't We Practice What We Preach? A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism, 14 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 126, 134 (2010) 
("Although religious people might be expected to express humanitarian acceptance of others, 
their humanitarianism is expressed primarily toward in-group members. Thus, we found little 
evidence that religiosity motivated racial tolerance."). 
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175 in 1990, to 300" in 2014. 23 Although sizeable enough to trigger the 
difficulties mentioned, the count does not include the vast catalog of 
informal human rights claims speakers casually assert.24 
Growing from a well-received core, more and more rights have 
accreted to the category. "Human rights have gone from a general list of 
what governments should not do to their citizens in the 1940s to a full-
blown moral-theological-political vision of the good life."25 The 
cumulative impact of this expanding roll of actionable human rights has 
been to diminish the power of the invocation; the mana of the call to 
human rights has been profaned through overuse. But the problem of 
immediate interest is that this vision of the good life is characteristically 
western, modem, and capitalist, with little to no tolerance for those 
societies that do not share these attributes. 26 Yet it is pushed out as 
generically "human," barely hiding the implication that societies which 
are not western, modern, and capitalist are backward, in some sense not 
fully human and therefore vulnerable to corrective interventions. 
One can tolerate a measure of imperfection in the 
implementation of a plan provided it nonetheless results in clear benefits. 
Unfortunately, observers are skeptical that "human rights treaties, on the 
.... WhQfo,.hav.e .... impxol\erl ..... the .... .well"be.ing .. of.people,.or.even .. result(:ld·in 
respect for the rights in those treaties."27 When looking at "whether 
countries that have ratified treaties are more likely than they otherwise 
would be to conform their actions to the requirements of the treaty," 
Oona Hathaway found that: 
[N]ot only is treaty ratification not associated with better human 
rights practices than otherwise expected, but it is often associated 
with worse practices. Countries that ratify human rights treaties often 
23 POSNER, supra note 4, at 92. 
24 A conveniently timed example appeared in the program for a recent society meeting, which 
promised a defense of "The Human 'Right' to Psychoanalysis." See Annual Meeting Program, L. 
& Soc'y Ass. 19 (June 2-4, 2016), 
http://www.lawandsociety.org/New0rleans20 I 6/docs/20 I 6 _Program.pdf. I did not attend this 
presentation, so my comments do not go beyond challenging the implications of the title. 
25 Richard Ashby Wilson, 7)11"annosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and 
Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE 
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 342, 349 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007). 
26 Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples, and the Pursuit of 
Justice, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 351, 356 (2016) ("Individual natural rights became 
synonymous with modernity, which was, in turn, irrevocably and undeniably Western."); see 
also Merry, supra note 21, at 29 ("Human rights is obviously based on Western liberal-legalist 
ideas, [even if] in the postcolonial world, it is no longer exclusively owned by the West."). 
27 POSNER, supra note 4, at 7. 
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appear less likely, rather than more likely, to confmm to the 
requirements of the treaties than countries that do not ratify these 
treaties. 28 
The explanation for this gap between fomrnl commitment and improved 
securities for citizens is invariably complex. The instances that relate 
most directly to the present discussion are those in which the state 
authorities fully endorse the international agreements, but have been 
unable to convince their citizens to amend their behaviors accordingly. 
Sonia HaITis-Shmi examined this situation in the context of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 29 Granting that the "Western 
educated elites will inevitably assimilate to some degree the dominate 
philosophical ideas and values of the West,"30 the national 
representatives nonetheless report that lack of implementation was 
"exacerbated by the prevailing perception among the local population 
that the general civil and criminal law, as opposed to customary law and 
practice, enshrines 'alien ideas' that have been forcibly imposed on them 
by more powerful outsiders."31 
The reported lack of improving conditions on the ground, in 
other words, can be linked to individuals' perceived foreignness of the 
......... mandated .. standanls ... ''.Ju.wbigb.Jbyy .. l:rnx~ .. AYYY.r ag!~yS:Qan£ljnthe, .. sr~at!2!1 ... 
of which they have played no part."32 The present discussion responds to 
HaITis-Shmi's observation that societies resist compliance with rules that 
do not reflect or even contradict their fundamental values. 
28 Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1989 
(2002). The finding that treaty ratification is nnlikely to lead to positive outcomes is especially 
true for autocratic regimes, presumably the environments where the human rights protections are 
most needed. Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for 
Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005). See also BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 12 (2009) (offering a slightly 
more optimistic conclusion) ("[R]egardless of their acknowledged role in generally separating 
the committed human rights defenders from the worst offenders, treaties also play a crucial 
restraining role."). But according to Samuel Moyn, the hope Simmons offers is "a pessimistic 
reformist hope." Samuel Moyn, Do Human Rights Make Enough of a Difference?, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 329, 330 (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas 
eds., 2012). 
29 Sonia Harris-Short, International Human Rights Lmv: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? 
Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 130 
(2003). 
30 Id. at 170. 
31 Id. at 143. 
32 Id. at 180. 
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C. ETHNOGRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS 
Given that a problem may exist in theory between the push for a 
uniform relationship between the state, its citizens, and the cultural 
values that give existential meaning to those citizens, a remedy is needed 
only if we have reason to believe that this tension actively manifests in 
real world interactions. Unfortunately, instances of such conflicts are not 
difficult to find. 
In Nepal, for example, Buddhists seeking to protest the effort by 
the state to establish Hinduism as the national religion marched under a 
banner that "Secularism is a human right."33 Although this may appear to 
be precisely the situation that the UDHR was intended to address, the 
action, however needful in order to promote their cause, came at a high 
cost. 
In order to defend themselves as Buddhists against the Hindu state, 
Buddhists have been compelled to call on human rights and to 
represent themselves according to the ontologies of identity that 
inhere in liberal law. However, it is precisely by disavowing key 
aspects of this liberal way of understanding the person that Buddhism 
distinguishes itself and constitutes its adherents as Buddhist. There is, 
n1e1:;;r0re;·ail Irrecoilc1Ia£Ie tension lle!Ween wliaf ·13uaa11r;;r;;·a0 aila········ 
the subjectivities they inhabit when they call on human rights, and the 
acts and identities whose rights are supposed to guarantee.34 
To preserve themselves as a distinct group, these Buddhists must adopt a 
worldview that erases the distinctiveness they hope to preserve. The 
tension represents a not uncommon instance when "people have been 
forced to claim rights that in fact represent losses to them."35 
As the Nepali Buddhists illustrate, one of the harmful 
consequences of the human rights program is that it banishes other 
means of expressive resistance.36 There now exists only one language in 
33 Lauren Leve, "Secularis111 Is a Human Right!": Double-Binds of Buddhis111, De111ocracy, and 
Idelllity in Nepal, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL 
AND THE LOCAL 78 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007). See also David N. Gellner, 
From Group Rights to Individual Rights and Back: Nepalese Stmggle over Culture and Equality, 
in CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 177, 186 (Jane K. Cowan, Marie-
Benedicte Dembour & Richard A. Wilson eds., 2001) (further describing the debate in Nepal). 
34 Leve, supra note 33, at 79. 
35 Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour, Part II: Claiming Cultural Rights, in CULTURE AND 
RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 149, 151 (Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte 
Dembonr & Richard A. Wilson eds., 2001 ). 
36 Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage, 
108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 56 (2006) ("[H]uman rights disconrse has now achieved a kind 
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which to voice a protest, one that is freighted with culturally specific 
presumptions about agency and self. The choice becomes to preserve the 
local values but lose the ability to effectively resist the injury, or to adopt 
the mandated forms at the cost ofunde1mining the very values wished to 
be preserved. 
The harm here may be mitigated because, according to Leve, the 
Buddhists are not themselves consciously "disturbed by the personal and 
cultural translations that the discursive practice of human rights entails" 
because here, as elsewhere, "people apply different logics and standards 
in different domains of life."37 But as a general rule in such matters, the 
viewpoint of the subject is not wholly determinative in deciding whether 
an injury exists. Were that the case, many human rights endeavors, such 
as the struggle to eliminate female genital cutting, would fail for lack of 
suppmi among the women such projects are intended to benefit. 38 
In a second ethnographic example, Heather Montgomery points 
out that many international standards, including the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, presuppose an ideal of childhood that "is based 
on a Western model which may not be appropriate for all societies. It 
implies that every child [defined as anyone under the age of eighteen] 
.... has. .. a .. rightJo 1:t.childhoodthatis . .fi:S<.e .. :f:m.m.Jhe .. JesPQlll'!ib.Uitie§ .... Qf . .w.Qrk., 
money and sex: in other words, a Western-style childhood."39 Although 
this ideal of childhood as an age of innocence did not become dominant 
in the West until the Victorian era,40 it is now the requirement worldwide. 
of hegemonic status: It is 'the sole approved discourse of resistance'. Hence it is important to pay 
attention both to what cannot be said in the language of human rights and to the way human 
rights discourses disempower other discourses of resistance."). 
37 Leve, supra note 33, at 106. 
38 See, e.g., Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hemlund, Female "Circumcision" in Afi·ica: 
Dimensions of the Practice and Debates, in FEMALE "CIRCUMCISION" IN AFRICA: CULTURE, 
CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE I, 24-25 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund eds., 2000) 
("The way that outraged 'Western' women championed the issue has since been accused of 
revealing 'latent racism,' 'intellectual neo-colonialism,' and 'anti-Arab and anti-Islamic fervor', 
and efforts to 'eradicate FGM' have been seen as an imperialistic intervention from meddling 
Westerners of privilege."). Thus we find justifications like the following: "it is not objectionably 
arrogant to protect interests that the intended beneficiaries have reason to regard as urgent, even 
if they do not actually do so." CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RlGHTS 204 (2009). 
39 Heather Montgomery, Imposing Rights? A Case Study of Child Prostitution in Thailand, in 
CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 80, 83 (Jane K. Cowan et al. eds., 
2001). 
40 HUGH CUNNINGHAM, CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN WESTERN SOCIETY SINCE 1500 72 (2005) 
("the truly revolutionary impact of Romanticism on thinking about childhood [is a shift] from 
being the smallest and least considered of human beings, the child had become endowed with 
qualities which made it godlike, fit to be worshipped, and the embodiment of hope."). See also 
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Montgomery illustrates the tension by documenting a rule which seems 
to promote an uncontroversial common good, that children should be 
free from sexual exploitation. In Thailand, however, enforcing that right 
can infringe on other rights: 
Child prostitution is not necessarily the self-evident evil it appears to 
be for outsiders; in Baan Nua, ensuring a child's right to be free from 
sexual exploitation would mean violating their rights to live with 
their families and in their communities .... Assuring one right only 
becomes possible at the expense of other rights - in this case to food, 
shelter and family unity, that is, precisely those rights which these 
families prioritize over the child's right to be free of sexual 
intervention.41 
From among equally valued rights, the subject's priorities 
arguably should prevail, not those of outsiders. This concession is 
especially prudent given the argument that any effort to prioritize human 
rights is impossible without recourse to pragmatics and political 
judgment.42 Imposed priorities are not the logical consequences of the 
rights but only the habitual preferences of external critics. 
These children tend not to see themselves as exploited, raising 
.th~. qµ~s1i9n. Fh§JQC;;'.IJhe xights tn111splanted fr.9.m ... mJtside ... shQuld. take. 
PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 47 (1962) 
("No doubt the discovery of childhood began in the thirteenth century, and its progress can be 
traced in the history of art in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But the evidence of its 
development became more plentiful and significant from the end of the sixteenth century and 
throughout the seventeenth."). The social constmction of childhood was one of the first 
conclusions from anthropology to receive popular attention. MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE 
IN SAMOA 196 ( 1972) ("Can we think of adolescence as a time in the life history of every girl 
child which carries with it symptoms of conflict and stress as surely as it implies a change in the 
girl's body? ... [W]e had to answer [this question] in the negative."). 
41 Montgomery, supra note 39, at 94-95. 
42 Gunnar Beck, The Mythology of Human Rights, 21 RATIO Jurus 312, 314 (2008). Pessimism 
about ranking human rights is justified because the values being compared are 
"incommensurable [meaning] it cannot be said of one that it is either better or worse than the 
other nor, importantly, that it is of equal value to another so that 'reason has no judgment to 
make concerning their relative values'." Id. at 317 (quoting Joseph Raz). See also James Griffin, 
The Relativity and Etlmocentricity of Human Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 555, 557 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015). If this is the case, then the human 
rights cannot be rationally argued to be superior to any competing moral code, such as those 
encountered in other societies. In face of this stubborn incomparability, our assumption of "the 
rationality and self-evidence of our values is itself, it would seem, a socially bred illusion-
dogmatism parading under a veneer of reason." SOLOMON ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 367-368 
(1952). 
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precedence over the "children's voices or disregard their worldview."43 
Montgome1y cautions that: 
[R]ights, especially the right to be free from sexual exploitation, do 
not need to be imposed on children without their consent. Rather, 
they can be built upon the rights that children claim are important to 
them. It is not that the child prostitutes do not want the right to be 
free of sexual exploitation, as promised in the UN Convention. It is, 
rather, that by taking that right out of context, and by disregarding the 
cultural prioritization of rights, its implementation is actually inimical 
to these paiiicular children's well-being.44 
A third observation is offered by James Zion, who criticizes the 
imposition of human rights law upon North American indigenes: 
The premises of modern human rights law are that the individual 
must be protected against the state in equality with all other 
individuals. While equality before the law and equality in access to 
the fundamentals of daily life are essential principles, they are not 
acceptable for Indians in their external relations with the outside 
world. Unbending equality is essentially assimilationist; and 
assimilation is ethnocidal and genocidal in its impact upon Indians, 
both as individuals and as groups.45 
·········u1iilf .info tlie 'ccfre pi'eceprn·· oiiniefifal!Onal numahtl:glitstawis ····· 
the assumption that the proper focus is the isolated individual. Although 
the view of the individual as the appropriate unit for liberal analysis is 
characteristic of Western political philosophy, alternative views take 
43 Montgomery, supra note 39, at 95. 
44 Id. at 97. Bell offers a similar description of how an outsider's perspective may result in a 
different conclusion concerning the proper priorities that should be given to a suite of interests: 
What is the standard of universality against which women's rights are to be tested? At 
first glance, Aboriginal customary marriages are in conflict with human rights 
provisions, for they involve "promised marriage" and "infant bestowal." The cultural 
context within which such marriages were contracted, however, binds kin in a web of 
reciprocal obligations, rights, and responsibilities that have implications for land 
ownership and ceremonial duties: in short, they were part and parcel of the survival of 
the culture. By focusing on the individual rights of one woman, the nature of the 
system of Aboriginal marriage arrangements is obscured. 
Diane Bell, Considering Gender: Are Human Rights for Women, Too? An Australian Case, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 339, 349 
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992). 
45 James W. Zion, North American Indian Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 191, 193 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na'im ed., 1992). 
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aggregates like the family as the center of moral claims. 46 Another 
approach finds that the right exists in the relationships between people, 
and not in the people themselves.47 The point is that: 
[C]oncepts of personhood va1y dramatically cross-culturally. In India 
and Melanesia, for example, a dominant view on the individual 
emphasizes that he or she is a product of social relations and far from 
that self-sustaining, independent and inviolable 'monad' the Western 
individual is seen as. In such societies, the community rather than the 
individual is accorded rights, and the individual has duties rather than 
rights. In such societies, individual human rights can be seen as truly 
alien, even if they are often promoted and adopted by some segments 
of society, usually educated middle-class elites.48 
Zion finds that "[t]he focus on the individual ignores the great 
importance of the group-of the family (and normally the extended 
family), of extended relationships of clan and religion, of the band or 
tribe, and even of 'Indian-ness' itself."49 The larger lesson is that such 
contrary accounts show that human rights as they are ordinarily 
understood in the international regime do not always evoke recognition 
or elicit agreement, nor is it obvious that the alternative arrangements are 
inferior. The harshest criticism for many alternatives is that they are not 
· ···· tne·serr:serectea vaTues··5rwesfe1:ners~ Tiiaf iJeCffgree; lloweve1:; 8Eoili<l-
not be the basis for compelling changes in others. "Our Kantian ethics 
46 Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 81, 84 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 
1992) ("[I]n most known past or present societies, human dignity is not private, individual, or 
autonomous. It is public, collective, and prescribed by social norms. The idea that an individual 
can enhance his or her 'dignity' by asserting his or her human rights violates many 
societies'most fundamental beliefs about the way social life should be ordered."). 
47 ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 43--44 ("The relational strand of thought concerning human rights 
never took hold. But nor did it die out False Within the single word, "right," regardless of how it 
is used - legally, politically, philosophically - it always references a complex set of 
relationsFalse In this sense, a right ... is not a thing unto,itself. Nor can individuals or groups 
somehow possess a right as the commonly used phrase "bundle of rights" would imply. A Right 
simply defines an "individual's position in a fluid network of social relations" and institutional 
configurations. So the meaningful unit of analysis cannot be the individual, the right, or the 
group - it is the nature of the interaction( s) that simultaneously defines all three.") 
48 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Multiculturalism, Individualism and Human Rights: Ro111anticis111, the 
En/ighte11111ent and lessons fi'om Afauritius, in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEXT: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 49, 64-65 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997). 
49 Zion, supra note 45, at 195. 
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invites us to assume that everyone wishes to be treated like we would 
like. This is rubbish."50 
Disagreements can arise over metaphysical beliefs as in the 
Nepalese example, the differing prioritization among rights found among 
Thai child prostitutes, or whether the identified bearer of the itemized 
right should be an atomized individual or, as among Native Americans, 
the community. Moreover, it should not escape notice that in all three 
instances the criticized societies are at a structural disadvantage in their 
encounters with outsiders seeking to dictate the proper anangement of 
internal social relationships. They are thus ill-positioned to flagrantly 
disregard the demand to comply. Given such power imbalances, altered 
behaviors may be more accurately understood as submission rather than 
the result of reform or modernization. 
If human rights are to live up to their promise we must assume 
that, as humans, all peoples should be able to relate in some positive way 
to any claim asserted under this label. The details may differ, but it 
would be odd if something that is held out as a fundamental requirement 
for the development of human potential would be alien, even 
incomprehensible to a nontrivial portion of the world's population. Even 
.... iU.Jl .. J:t9xi\;tJY.th~L Q.\;m!~sl t.hQ§~J!gQ.!§ ~gg X~.Pi:~.s§~s!Jg()~9 he,.~clg£1~~. !he 
citizens should agree that the proffered human right would be a general 
good, all things considered. To adopt a contrary opinion colors 
noncompliant societies as outliers, either as not being fully human, or 
ignorant of the way to properly manage their own humanity. 
II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Moving from the description of the problem to the more f01mal 
analyses, we find that the difficulty, and its solution, is overdetermined. 
Independent approaches from jurisprudence and legal anthropology show 
that if the disagreement is to be rectified, there must be a transparent 
treatment of what it means to be "human." If that can be achieved, the 
identification of human rights should preserve those p01iions of the 
cmTent regime that can be validated cross-culturally. 
From the perspective of impacted societies, the introduction of 
human rights obligations raises issues of legal transplants. A term 
introduced by Alan Watson, "legal transplant" refers to "the moving of a 
50 Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV.!, 2 (1997) (quoting Martti Koskenniemi). 
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rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people 
to another."51 As shown by Watson, that fact does not make the 
introduced rule illegitimate. Special problems, however, arise that 
influence how and under what conditions a rule will be received. 
To help understand these problems, the next section considers a 
recent exchange between two legal philosophers, Joseph Raz and Jeremy 
Waldron. Raz represents a group of thinkers who believe that we should 
take human rights as a pragmatic given and cease looking for anything 
deeper that links or justifies them.52 The purportedly false premise that 
"human rights" encodes fundamental assumptions of humanness and 
personhood has led to an unprofitable debate and distracts from what is 
truly important, such as policing states to safeguard the rights of their 
citizens. 
Waldron disagrees, arguing instead that Raz's approach fails to 
adequately capture why we find the idea of the human right so 
compelling. While admitting that the search for philosophical 
foundations for the category can be elusive and frustrating, Waldron 
believes that anything less misses the point.53 
The problem described by Waldron can be reduced to the 
.struggl@.to definethe-0ateg0i:ye.£r~ghts·ef:humans.·Whatcleesthatword··· · 
refer to? The final section reviews concerns that have been expressed by 
anthropologists about the gap between the label and the actual contents 
of the legal regime. 
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND 
The contrast between the rhetoric of a universal human right 
localized and the practicalities of local ideals universalized can be 
51 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (2d ed. 1994). 
52 A thorough defense of this approach is offered by Charles Beitz: "A practical conception [of 
human rights] takes the doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international 
political life as the source materials for constrncting a conception of human rights. It understands 
questions about the nature and content of human rights to refer to objects of the sort called 
"human rights" in international practice. There is no assumption of a prior or independent layer 
of fundamental rights whose nature and content can be discovered independently of a 
consideration of the place of human rights in the international realm and its normative discourse 
and then used to interpret and criticize international doctrine. Similarly, it is not assumed that 
human rights seek to describe what is actually common to all political-moral codes or to state 
common standards reachable to inference from them. Instead, we take the functional role of 
human rights in international discourse and practice as basic: it constrains our conception of a 
human right from the start." BEITZ, supra note 38, at 102--03. 
53 See i11fi·a notes 72-80 and accompanying text. 
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illustrated through a recent exchange between legal philosophers Raz and 
Waldron. Their disagreement underscores the ongoing debate over the 
intrinsic nature of the human right, whether it has an essence at all, and if 
so, of what kind. 
The relevance of the problem to identify what the human rights 
have in common is of the highest order. Appeals to human rights ideals 
characterize the theme of the post-World War II political order. 
Emerging from the chaos and confusion of the destructive excesses of an 
international system grounded in state sovereignty, human rights arose as 
a preventive counterbalance. This history renders it possible that human 
rights are an ad hoc collection of remedies rather than the actualization of 
a natural kind. 
Raz criticizes what he terms the "traditional" approach to human 
rights, which has two distinctive elements: it "aims 'to derive' human 
rights from basic features of human beings which are both valuable and 
in some way essential to all which is valuable in human life ... [and] 
Second, [that] human rights are basic, perhaps the most basic and most 
important, moral rights."54 He finds three weaknesses in all attempts to 
develop this line of thinking that helps to create the mythology of the 
........... human •. 1ight .... as •. supranationaLYalue.s.:; .. Eits.t, ... '..'.[tJhey ... Jnisconcei¥eJh1;1. 
relations between values and rights."56 In other words, not all goods are 
necessarily rights. Other means exist to achieve normative goals than the 
reduction of all conflicts and disagreements to fit the model of 
adversarial legal enforcement of entitlements. Second, foundational 
efforts "overreach, trying to derive rights which they cannot derive. And 
they fail either to illuminate or to criticize the existing human rights 
practice. "57 
Rather than reasoning forward from first principles such as 
personhood, dignity, well-being, or actualization, Raz prefers to argue 
backwards from the fact that human rights institutions and instruments 
exist, making the primaiy question how to best refine and demarcate the 
limits of that practice.58 Human rights do not need to be justified; they 
54 Joseph Raz, Human Rights without Foundations, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
321, 323 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 20 I 0). 
55 Raz's discussion highlights in this regard the efforts of Alan Gewirth and James Griffin. 
56 Raz, supra note 54, at 323. 
57 Id. at 324-24. 
58 Id. at 327. 
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need to be improved. Following Rawls's discussion,59 Raz defines human 
rights as "rights which set limits to the sovereignty of states, in that their 
actual or anticipated violation is a ( defeasible) reason for taking action 
against the violator in the international arena."60 This approach appears to 
internationalize the legal realism invoked by Oliver Wendall Holmes's 
"bad man" rule to identify law as the rules courts are willing to enforce, 
and not by the statements in statute books.61 By analogy, human rights 
are the rules whose breach will justify military intervention against a 
sovereign state, and only those. 
In this view, no human right to education exists (as proclaimed 
by UDHR Article 26) because it is not likely to be a cause "whose 
violation might justify international action against a state." As examples 
of true human rights, Raz offers the list constructed by Rawls: 
The right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty 
(to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a 
sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of 
religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal 
equality as expressed by the mies of natural justice (that is, that 
similar cases be treated similarly).62 
··Whateverthe·rightsare·decided/tcr·be;Raz~s point··istlrat''tlremcrrai 
principles determining the limits of sovereignty must reflect not only the 
limits of the authority of state [i.e., what it is thought the state should or 
should not be able to do], but also the relatively fixed limitations on the 
possibility of justified interference by international organisations and by 
other states in the affairs of even an offending state. "63 Human rights 
occur at the intersection of the abstract political philosophies on the 
proper role of governments and the legitimate extent of their powers, 
with the practical realities of the acceptable justifications one state can 
offer-to other states and to its own citizens-to invade a sovereign 
entity that is not directly threatening it. 
Raz's thesis forces him into potentially awkward conundrums. 
He concludes, for example, that because Rawls has, like other 
traditionalists, similarly failed to differentiate between rights and values, 
59 See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 79 (2001) ("Human rights are a class of rights that play 
a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its 
conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy."). 
60 Raz, supra note 54, at 328. 
61 Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
62 RAWLS, supra note 59, at 65. 
63 Raz, supra note 54, at 331. 
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he asse1is as rights matters that are merely wrongs. "Some of [Rawls's] 
human rights, for example the human right against genocide, do not 
appear to be rights at all. To be sure committing genocide is wrong, but 
is it the case that I have a right against the genocide of any people? ... 
Not all wrongs constitute violations of rights. Not all the limits of either 
state authority or state sovereignty are set by rights."64 
Suggesting that genocide violates no human rights is an odd 
result given that human rights specifically emerged as a response to the 
acts of genocide by the Nazis. Ordinary citizens may say that if 
preventing the physical annihilation of an entire people does not rise to 
the level of the human right, then there are no human rights. 
In the end, contrary to the traditionalists he sees himself as 
arguing against, Raz concludes that: 
Individual rights are human rights if they disable a certain argument 
against interference by outsiders in the affairs of a state. They 
disable, or deny the legitimacy of the response: I, the stale, may have 
acted wrongly, but you, the outsiders are not entitled to interfere. I 
am protected by my sovereignty. Disabling the defence 'none of your 
business', is definitive of the political conception of human rights. 
They are rights which are morally valid against states in the 
· ······· ·····rnrei'naflonar ·arena;··arrd t11eff is·110reasoff mtmrrk:··fhm suc11 rtg;lmr · 
must be universal. 65 
Raz ends by clarifying his final position: 
So that is where human rights come from. They derive from three 
layers of argument. First, some individual interest often combined 
with showing how social conditions require its satisfaction in certain 
ways (e.g. via various forms of instruction) establishing an individual 
moral right. ... The second layer shows that under some conditions 
states are to be held duty bound to respect or promote the interest (or 
the rights) of individuals identified in the first part of the 
argument ... The final layer shows that they do not enjoy immunity 
from interference regarding these matters. If all parts of the argument 
succeed then we have established that a human right exists. 66 
64 Id. at 332. The specification that the claimed right is against the genocide of "any" people is 
critical to Raz's argument. If the concern is about genocide of my people, then the right dissolves 
to a more ordinary claim to the right not be killed unjustly. In this light, many asserted human 
rights may be reducible to a broader power to stand in the place of others who are unable to 
effectively exercise their individual rights. To speak of a "right against genocide" (and possibly 
other such collective rights), then, reifies what is essentially a process to assert by proxy a more 
fundamental right. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 336. 
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Notably, within this framework "human rights need not be universal or 
foundational."67 In the "first layer" leading to human rights, an 
"individual interest" combines with "social conditions" to form an 
"individual moral right."68 These interests and conditions are necessarily 
variable. With the generation of divergent moral rights differently 
nurtured under sundry legal systems, the emergent norm of the human 
right will easily vary over time if not geography. Any general 
consistency that arises will be due to contingently shared assumptions 
grounding the initial individual interests, rather than necessary 
conclusions about the nature of human rights. 
There is much to admire in this description. Raz recognizes that 
to call something a "human right" lacks any helpful analytic edge. He 
emphasizes the categ01y's pragmatic application as the solution, a sword 
to puncture sovereignty when a state fails to adequately protect rights 
that it can control. If violations would not warrant an all-but literal 
"nuclear option," then that interest or value does not qualify as a human 
right. 
The gap within Raz's account is that while the human rights 
have indeed become the "ethical !inga franca" of the modern world,69 
. they.hav:eaGhieved suchstatus.··011the.implied···feundationalaeeount····ef ...... . 
the traditionalists. In that story, human rights are grounded in the 
existential state of being human rather than in the specific relationship 
between a citizen and the state. 70 Human rights are what binds us across 
state borders, and become the expressive vehicle for empathic responses 
to the suffering of others. The account Raz offers favoring the accidental 
obligations between governments and citizens may in some sense be 
more accurate descriptively, but it generates a radically different 
outcome in terms of popular imagination. Raz's approach is a rule for 
states, perhaps, but contains little to inspire people and generate the 
popular support upon which the human rights regime depends. 
67 Id. at 332. 
68 Id. at 336. 
69 John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN 
RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR 75 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007). 
70 See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Conclusion, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 427, 429-431 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 
1992) ("[M]uch of the authority of the concept [of human rights] is derived from its presumed or 
alleged universality-that is, the notion that human rights are the entitlements of all human 
beings throughout the world with no distinction as to race, gender, religion, and so on."). 
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Waldron admits that there can be intellectual difficulties in the 
traditional struggle to ground human rights in the state of being 
"human": "many will say that the attribution to Cro-Magnon man of the 
rights that we take to be human rights today makes no sense."71 As 
anthropology has demonstrated, a wide range of ways to be human 
exists. The effo1i to capture underlying consistencies within that diversity 
can be daunting. 
Waldron begins by identifying two major trends within effmis to 
analyze the category of the human right. The first follows the 
traditionalist approach that understands the "human" of human rights to 
refer to the bearers of the relevant right.72 The second "refers not to the 
right bearers (and their humanity) but to the class of people for whom 
violations of these rights are properly a matter of concern .... The idea is 
that there is a class of rights such that no human should be indifferent to 
the violation of any right in that class."73 Under this second reading, it is 
conceivable that animals can have "human rights" not because they are 
human, but because their mistreatment provokes censure from humans. 
Labeling the human concern approach the "Armed Intervention View,"74 
Waldron further distinguishes whether the position is permissive or 
.. obligato1¥ .. Raw:lsrhe .. says, .. re.garded.intervention.as.pe:i.mitted, .... but .. Raz. 
"couches his view more affirmatively," implying that "in the absence of 
reasons to the contrary, non-intervention in response to a violation of one 
of these rights would be wrong."75 
Waldron critiques the Armed Intervention View on three 
distinguishable grounds. First, intervention is appropriate for multiple 
reasons, not just for human rights violations. Regional destabilization, 
whether or not rights are involved, is one such justification. Yet "it seems 
odd to hold the 'human' in 'human right' hostage to geopolitical factors 
71 Jeremy Waldron, Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach 1 (N.Y. Univ. School of 
Law, Working Paper No. 13-32, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjd=2272745. 
72 This is the sense adopted in the present paper. 
73 Waldron, supra note 71, at 2. 
74 Id at 4 ("According to the version of the human concei;n approach I have in mind, a right is 
properly described as a human right if the appropriate response to its violation by an otherwise 
sovereign state is armed inte1ference by an outside state or an international organization aimed at 
remedying or punishing or preventing the continuance of the sovereign state's violation."). 
75 Id. at 7. Waldron may be overstating Raz's position here. As noted earlier, Raz states that a 
violation is a "defeasible" reason for intervention, not an obligatory one. Raz, supra note 54, at 
328. 
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in this way."76 The second criticism is that decisions to intervene will 
depend on a plethora of factors beyond the simple identification of a 
rights violation. Again, these kinds of calculations seem to cut against 
the understanding of what it means for something to be a human right: 
As things stand, we identify rights as human rights using general 
descriptions-like the right to free speech or the right not to be 
tortured. We don't usually refer to them as the right to free-speech-in-
Kosovo or the right not-to-be-tortured-in-Iraq. But if the designation 
of a right as human depends on the all-things considered 
appropriateness of humanitarian intervention to vindicate that right, 
then a given right will tum out to be a human right in some settings 
but not in others, depending on how the array of considerations 
relevant to the justification of humanitarian intervention plays out in 
each setting. The right not to be tortured might prove to be a human 
right in Iraq in 2000, but what we usually identify as the same right 
might prove not to be a human right in Syria in 2001 because (at the 
date of writing: May 2013) the practicalities argue against 
humanitarian intervention against the atrocities of the Assad 
regime. 77 
It is, he concludes "counterintuitive to have the predicate 'human' apply 
to rights in this contingent and situational fashion." 
.......... ·Tne Tflird:;and .. perliaps··· mosr····troubilng···flaw ·1u······the.Almed .. 
Intervention View, is "the way it sells short the individualism of human 
rights. "78 We would not intervene in response to the torture of one 
person, although we may if thousands are tortured. That political reality 
discredits the injury that has been done to that person since, by definition 
under the Armed Intervention View, there has been no human right 
violation because there has been no subsequent intervention. This 
emphasis away from the individual is at odds with the ordinary discourse 
of human rights, which underscores the importance and value of each 
person. 
By the end of his analysis, Waldron concludes that we should 
"reject the proposal to define a right as a human right simply in virtue of 
the type of external response that is appropriate when it is violated."79 He 
grants, however, both that the traditionalist focus on the rights-bearer has 
significant difficulties, and that "[ s ]mne of the ideas picked out by the 
human concern view are surely important, and it may well be that we 
76 Waldron, supra note 71, at 8. 
77 Id. at 10. 
78 Id. at 11. 
79 Id. at 20. 
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should seek eclectically some sort of combination of approaches, with a 
set of rights being identified as human rights both (a) in terms of their 
being rooted in distinctively human interests, on the one hand, and (b) in 
terms of their violation being an appropriate subject of global human 
concern. "80 
The task, in other words, is to reconcile contradictory intuitions 
and historical realities. The latter recognizes that the human rights have 
been created to solve specific problems of political organization based on 
the presumptive inviolability of state sovereignty. The former, though, 
insists that human rights exist prior to the state, and demand recognition 
and reaction. The challenging nature of human rights is that both these 
mutually exclusive claims are true. 
Waldron suggests that a middle course be found that respects 
both the pragmatics of taking human rights in some sense as a given as 
well as the intuitions that the value of human rights flows from their 
roots in our shared status as human beings. Part III will attempt to offer 
such a compromise by grounding human rights in the shared norms of 
the world's societies rather than abstracted out of philosophical 
principles or selected from the values of only a few powerful groups. 
B. ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY 
As admitted by one author, "[t]hat a universal law of human 
rights has the potential to erase cultural diversity is hardly disputable. "81 
When discussing a draft of this paper, a colleague suggested that this 
possible outcome was not a true quandary because cultural diversity 
should be eliminated, thus clearing the path to universal and uniform 
rights for all. Few may state this conviction so bluntly, but in practice it 
may well be the prevailing posture.82 The reasoning appears to be that 
80 Id. at 21. But cf. Joseph Raz, On Waldron's Critique of Raz on Human Rights, (Columbia Law 
School, Working Paper No. 13-359, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307471 (claiming that 
Waldron has misunderstood his position). 
81 Otto, supra note 50, at 7. 
82 "[V]irtually every government of a sovereign state, north or south, has adopted a modernization 
outlook that regards premodern culture as a form of backwardness to be overcome for the sake of 
the indigenous. Proceeding on that basis, the preferred normative response to the existence of 
indigenous peoples is not deference to their cultural autonomy, but rather their orderly and 
equitable assimilation into the more benevolent and promising cultural space of the modernizing 
ethos." Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the Intemational Protection of Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44, 47 
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992). 
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some fortunate societies have hit upon a clearly superior way of life and 
all other versions should converge toward that solution. Whatever 
disagreement exists on fundamental values will be resolved when 
dissidents are either assimilated or allowed to slide into extinction. 
A different point of view-one typical of anthropologists-holds 
that human societies display a range of norms and organizational 
systems, and that this diversity is a good that should be valued.83 Cultural 
variability is not slightly different shades of the same hue; practices can 
be markedly divergent so that something commonplace in one can be 
strangely alien in another. As Posner points out, "foreign countries really 
are foreign. It is hard for us to understand their peoples, customs, 
institutions, and pathologies."84 The fact of difference complicates even 
talking about universal goals, much less attaining them. "For example, 
during translation of the 1988 Annual Report of the Yukon Human 
Rights Commission, it was discovered that the term 'equal,' in its human 
rights context, did not have an equivalent in any of the six Aboriginal 
languages used in the publication."85 
Anthropologists grew concerned that a regime of human rights 
may not be sufficiently respectful of all peoples, prompting them to 
.... ~xpress earlyskepti{>ism .ove1° theprojeet,Wht}n·4he·lJQHR··was·being······ 
drafted the American Anthropological Association (AAA) voiced its 
concerns that parochial values of the victorious West would be projected 
outward as the only suitable aspirations for all peoples:86 
83 Cultural diversity has been analogized to the importance of biodiversity. Maffi describes "the 
interwoven (and possibly coevolved) diversity in nature and culture to be the 'preeminent fact of 
existence,' the basic condition of life on earth. The continued decrease of biocultural 
diversity . . . would 'staunch the historical flow of being itself, the evolutionary processes 
through which the vitality of all life has come down to us through the ages.'" Luisa Maffi, 
Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 599, 603 (2005) 
(citing DAVID HARMON, IN LIGHT OF OUR DIFFERENCES: How DIVERSITY IN NATURE AND 
CULTURE MAKES US HUMAN xiii (2002)). 
84 POSNER, supra note 4, at 146. 
85 Allan McChesney, Aboriginal Co111111u11ities, Aboriginal Rights, and the Human Rights System in 
Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 221, 
229 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992). 
86 Am. Anthropological Ass'n, Statement 011 Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947). 
Roberts notes that the AAA was not the only skeptical voice over the human rights project. See 
ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 12 ("[P]rominent professional organizations such as the American Bar 
Association, the American Anthropological Association, and the American Medical Association, 
as well as progressive thinkers such as Hersch Lauterpacht, Hannah Arendt, and Mohandas 
Gandhi - each for their own reasons - also rejected key aspects of the new human rights 
concept."). Bryan Turner describes how sociology was likewise "skeptical, on historical and 
comparative grounds, about the possibility of the social existence of universalistic rights and 
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No matter how well-intentioned the [UN Commission on Human 
Right's] effort the result of any internationally sanctioned statement 
of rights would be the imposition of hegemonic moral values on less 
powerful groups of people whose patterns of behavior were 
misunderstood and reviled by Western elites.87 
It feared the document's normative assumptions would 
disprop01iionately favor "the personality of the individual" at the 
expense of the equally important "cultures of differing human groups." 
Given that "the individual realizes his personality tln·ough his culture," 
and that it is not possible to qualitatively evaluate and rank the world's 
different cultures,88 the risk was high that any expression of idealized 
values, while seemingly self-evident to those who share similar cultural 
backgrounds, would be incomprehensible to others. "What is held to be a 
human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another 
people. "89 
The risk, at least from the perspective of antln·opologists, would 
be that parochial values would be elevated to the status of human 
universal values and then reverse-engineered to impose them upon 
nonconforming societies under the authority ofUDHR Article 28. Article 
28 states that "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
· · · · wil1ch~tl1e"r1gfits and riee<loills seT r0:rn1· rritnrs necra1:afion ca11· oerun.Y 
realized." The "social and international order" envisioned is expressly 
the modern sovereign state containing economic systems sufficiently 
complex to require rights to trade unions (Article 23) and "periodic 
holidays with pay" (Article 24), which leaves little room for the simpler 
societies historically favored by anthropologists. 
obligations." Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theol)' of Human Rights, 27 Soc. 489, 489-490 
(1993). 
87 Mark Goodale, Toward a Critical Anthropology of Human Rights, 47 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
485, 486 (2006). 
88 The belief that some cultures are intrinsically inferior to others has become a revived opinion. 
See, e.g., Shalailah Medhora, Tony Abbott Says Political Future Not "Entirely Resolved", But 
Hints He Will Stay in Parliament, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
https: //www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/ dec/08/tony-ab bott-po 1 i tical-future-not -
resolved-but-hints-he-will-stay-in-parliament ("All cultures are not equal, and frankly, culture 
that believes in decency and tolerance is much to be preferred than one that thinks that you can 
kill in the name of God, and you've got to be prepared to say that."); David Brooks, All Cultures 
Are Not Equal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2005), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?reF990CE2DA l 43EF932A257 5BCOA9639C8B63. 
89 Am. Anthropological Ass'n, supra note 86, at 542. 
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As a profession, anthropology did not reengage in the debates 
over human rights until the late eighties.90 This lack of pmiicipation 
unfortunately allowed many of the background practices and 
assumptions concerning the identification, application and enforcement 
of human rights to become normalized into uncontroversial premises 
without input from the academic specialty most familiar with the range 
of human organizations. When the field again turned its attention to the 
topic of international human rights, the renewed attention did not flow 
from a reduced skepticism concerning the potential for traditional 
societies to be disadvantaged by global institutions. Instead, it reflected a 
begrudged realization that the power exerted by these institutions had 
become too pervasive globally to ignore. Human rights ideology and its 
accompanying accoutrements had become a part of the cultural 
landscape that anthropologists endeavor to study. 
A recent histmy of the drafting of the UDHR imparts that the 
underlying values of the Declaration were not quite as nanowly 
parochial as the AAA had feared. 91 We have good reason to believe that 
drafters of the UDHR thought themselves to be speaking in the more 
inclusive sense of human. While not venturing beyond the scope of 
... modem ... ..states, .the ... preliminary .documet1ts .. at least ..... i;;up;~yed .. a broad 
spectrum of those members. 92 
Even if the most significant gaps would eventually be conected 
with the UN's later Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,93 
the philosophical problem raised by the AAA remains. The label of 
"human right" is a powerful talisman, and one that should be used 
carefully and in full awareness of its unspoken premises. What makes 
something a human as opposed to a local civil right? The debate can be 
critical because while civil rights can remain a legitimate focus of 
90 GOODALE, SURRENDERING TO UTOPIA, supra note 11, at 25, 31 ("[H]uman rights vanish from 
the anthropological radar for almost forty years .... American anthropology, not to mention the 
wider discipline, played almost no role in the formal development of human rights theory or 
institutional practice in the important first decades of the postwar periodFalse [I]t wouldn't be 
until the 1980s that anthropology as a discipline took a sustained interest in human rights for the 
first time."). According to his review, "[a]fter 1949, the phrase 'human rights' did not appear in 
the title of any atticle published in the AAA's flagship peer-reviewed journal until 1987." 
Goodale, Toward a Critical Anthropology, supra note 87, at 487. 
91 See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (200 I). 
92 Id. at 73 (reflecting responses to "about seventy questionnaires asking for reflections on human 
rights from Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, and customaty law perspectives, as well as from American, 
European, and socialist points of view."). 
93 G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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spirited discussion, once something has been named a "human right," in 
practice all reasonable dissent ceases. 
If the reasons behind the proposal of specific human rights were 
to become more transparent we might then reliably sort which should (or 
should not) be contained within the category. This, incidentally, was 
precisely the tactic that the UN Committee had eschewed: Believing a 
consensus on human rights could be found if eve1yone was allowed to 
use their own viewpoints, the drafting committee omitted any mention of 
the philosophical sources for the named rights.94 This reticence contrasts 
with the U.S. Declaration of Independence, for example, which was able 
to justify its claims "that all men are created equal" and that they possess 
"ce1iain inalienable Rights" by the dual assertions that these conclusions 
were at once "self-evident" and thus needed no further justification, but 
also that, if such were needed, these rights were gifts from "their 
Creator." But while avoiding any fundamental justifications may have 
been a pragmatically successful strategy to achieve consensus on the 
UDHR among culturally and philosophically diverse groups, the 
document remains nonetheless committed to the position that human 
rights were recognized rather than conferred by the member states. In 
.......... ..the01y" .. w.the ..... 1JDHR. articulate.Ii. xights ... imiiYi~lulils Jlh:()agy .PQ§§~§s,.misL 
which states are tasked to respect and, when necessary, defend. Even 
when intending to be agnostic on the ontology of human rights, assuming 
that they are fundamentally inherent to all peoples seems to be 
unavoidable if they are to have the desired impact. Despite efforts like 
Raz's, the clash between human diversity and human rights callllot be 
dissolved by tinkering with our formal definition of human rights. 
In that confrontation between law and culture, a significant 
change has been the improved understanding of culture. When 
antln-opologists returned to the question of human rights they brought 
with them a more sophisticated concept. Whereas earlier there had been a 
tendency to speak of culture as timeless and unchanging, and thus an 
unyielding obstacle to the introduction of new values without inevitably 
"breaking" or damaging the society, that blanket premise is no longer 
widely held. "The tendency in much of anthropology over the past fifteen 
94 "The main difficulty in framing the introductory 'General Principles,' [Rene] Cassin later wrote, 
was to 'find a formula that did not require the Commission to take sides on the nature of man and 
society, or to become immured in metaphysical controversies, notably the conflict among 
spiritual, rationalist, and materialist doctrines on the origin of human rights."' GLENDON, A 
WORLD MADE NEW, supra note 91, at 68. 
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years [has been] to complicate or even abandon the notion of culture."95 
Rather than a stagnant receptacle to preserve the past, culture's function 
is to solve problems in the present, which requires that it be capable of 
dynamically adapting to a changing environment. 
Cultures consist of repertoires of ideas and practices that are not 
homogeneous but continually changing because of contradictions 
among them or because new ideas and institutions are adopted by 
members. They typically incorporate contested values and practices. 
Cultures are not contained within stable borders but are open to new 
ideas and permeable to influences from other cultural systems, 
although not all borders are equally porous. Cultural discourses 
legitimate or challenge authority and justify relations of power. 96 
Former pessimism among anthropologists about the influence of human 
rights rules on traditional societies has faded. Now, the realization is that 
a culture can absorb and interpret almost any new infonnation, especially 
if that information is properly introduced over adequate time. This 
openness results in change, but in a manner that allows the understanding 
of itself as a distinctive group to remain coherent. This revised culture 
concept means that groups are more active in their responses to the 
.i~.!r().~l1,~ti()1:1 ... ()L~~~.~.1:1~ S()1!1:~ti,1J2e,s ~()1:11E.~.4i~.!()1:¥ .. ".a!~.e,.~.: .. :t::r5~J~.1:JJ~.e,i: mere 
carriers of an unchanging past, societies can each devise their own ways 
f01ward. 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the expected cultural flexibility 
while still remaining hue to the culture's self-understanding. Cultural 
teachings concerning what is right, good, and n01mal fonn the building 
blocks of identity and default worldview, and thus cannot be easily or 
quickly rewritten. The norms of culture deeply permeate the definitions 
of self and are the standards by which we each find meaning and purpose 
in life. The powerful influence of these formative assumptions become 
evident when migrating into a new context with different conclusions on 
those questions.97 Dissonance can result in well-intentioned people 
inadvertently violating the nonnative expectations of the new society. 
95 Karen Engle, Fro111 Skepticis111 to Embrace: H11111an Rights and the American Anthropological 
Association from 1947 to 1999, in ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL 
CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 344, 345 (Richard Shweder et al. eds., 2002). 
96 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCALJUSTICE 11 (2006). 
97 See, e.g., RALPH LINTON, THE TREE OF CULTURE 39 (1961) ("Even the most deliberately 
unconventional person is unable to escape his culture to any significant degree."). 
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Change is possible, but should be expected to be neither easy nor 
painless. 
Other instances of clashes between cultural diversity with new 
nonns of social regulation prove instructive to illustrate this difficulty. 
Within the American criminal legal system, this dissonance has been 
framed as a question concerning the legitimacy and permissibility of the 
"culture defense."98 To the extent courts are concerned with fair and 
equitable outcomes, judges have sometimes allowed evidence of foreign 
cultural nonns to serve as mitigating circumstances dming sentencing, 
or, more rarely, as defenses to the charge itself.99 These allowances are 
feasible only after understanding that others can act in ways that are 
reasonable from their view. Just as we act in ways that are reasonable in 
ours, so too may others lack the required "guilty mind" often required for 
punishment. 100 
Once it has been thought inequitable to demand that all persons 
in every circumstance comply with a uniform set of criminal rules, the 
door opens to recognize that societies can view the broader norms of 
behavior differently. Any claim enforcing a universal standard of 
conduct, the human rights, should therefore reflect that diversity in either 
... .!h.~. J>1!Q§!eiltix~ nil~§th~.ms!".JYes, gr thfgt,igh tE:~ ... PEo,ce.s§.~.§ that craft the 
rules. 
Recognizing normative diversity compels us to be more explicit 
about what are the assumptions generating the global roster of human 
rights. Where the supposedly universal human right reflects locally 
98 ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004). Although more popularly referred 
to as "cultural defenses," the preceding paragraphs demonstrate that all defenses are cultural. To 
refer to those asserted by immigrants as "cultural" creates the falsely misleading impression that 
only foreigners have "culture," while we rely on something else, perhaps reason and rational 
judgment. The term "cultural defense" is thus subtly ethnocentric, and should be avoided. See 
also James M. Donovan & John Stuart Garth, Delimiting the Culture Defense, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 109 (2007). 
99 A second area of study within this third category concerns legal pluralism: when one unit, such 
as a political state, contains within it subsets of additional legal rules. To find this condition it is 
usually necessary to have a broad definition of what constitutes "law." But even more strict 
narrow definitions find pluralism to have been the normal condition under colonial rule when 
one set of laws governed matters of interest to the occupying state, while the indigenous peoples 
were allowed to maintain or develop their own solutions for conflicts of little interest to the 
foreign adminish·ators, such as family and probate complaints. 
100 The facts of State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996) offer an easy illustration of this point. An 
Afghani immigrant was charged with gross sexual assault after kissing the penis of his nine-
month-old son. A show of respect within his own culture, this same act was criminalized by the 
state as a sexual perversion. This was a difference of which Kargar could not reasonably have 
been aware, leading to his acquittal. 
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favored, but ultimately arbitrary preferences, the dominant powers 
should question the appropriateness of imposing it upon societies with 
different but equally valid ideas. These hidden assumptions can be 
gleaned from the earlier examples: the collision with human rights forced 
the Nepalese Buddhists to act as though the individual is the moral 
center; the realities experienced by Thai child prostitutes were 
shoehorned into a model of development in which children are carefree 
and irresponsible for eighteen years; and the First Peoples of North 
America were compelled to subordinate their group living in favor of 
personal desires. Even when the actions urged by outsiders are beneficial 
in a utilitarian calculus, that outcome does not suppmi their 
characterization as universally valid normative rules. But it is also 
possible that some reasonable candidates for presumptively universal 
nonnative rules do exist, if a suitable method can be found to identify 
them. 
Diversity has its own value. Human rights advocates must leave 
a place for difference in their plans. In those situations where diversity 
concerns have been fully considered, the modem understanding of 
culture presents no obstacle to change. Adaptation is possible, but only 
slowly, ... 11nd .... only . .when.communicatedin.a .. manner.thatfi:am~sth€H166a 
to adapt in the vernacular of local norms rather than as a demand to adopt 
foreign manners. 
III. FINDING "HUMAN" HUMAN RIGHTS 
Instead of the top-down transplant of human rights, several 
writers have suggested human rights should be built bottom-up upon the 
values that societies already have. 101 If that can be done, the challenge 
shifts from condescendingly schooling the "Other" in what it means to be 
human, to encouraging them to live by the standards they themselves 
believe they should observe. These norms can be identified empirically, 
providing the raw conceptual material to draft human rights standards 
that embody priorities recognized by most cultures. This is the "least 
common denominator" method most closely associated with the early 
work of Alison Dundes Renteln. 
101 "A committed vanguard of scholars has arisen to resolve, in a sense, the tension between cultural 
diversity and the universalist program of international human rights by identifying those points at 
which cultural traditions overlap in a way that reconciles them to both the idea and the 
substantive content of international human rights." GOODALE, supra note 11, at 80. 
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Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im offers a different solution that 
begins by acknowledging that societies often contain a range of opinions 
on normative questions. Taking the existing regime of international law 
as given, An-Na 'im proposes successive dialogues. 102 The first seeks to 
resolve existing normative diversity within a society in the direction of 
the formal human rights rnles. 103 Remaining disagreement between 
societies would be negotiated by subsequent cross-cultural dialogues. 104 
In combination, these techniques promise to yield a defensible 
list of human rights that protect relevant interests against state 
interference while being translatable into the existing norms of all 
groups. The missing piece, however, is an independent standard of 
evaluation that can be employed to break any impasse during cross-
cultural dialogues. Because all societies possess the idea of fairness, Part 
IV proposes employing that intuition to complete the description of a 
realistic method to identify the human rights. 
A. LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR 
Societies are adaptive responses to panhuman problems rooted, 
....... aeco:i:<ling-te Turner, in .the.universaLexperience. of .. '.'human frailty'.:(.e.,g,,. 
shelter, sustenance, reproduction, security). 105 Because many of these 
problems are best approached in groups rather than individually (e.g., 
hunting large animals, defense against opposing groups), much of the 
work of social living concerns balancing individual desires and 
motivations with cooperative goals. 106 Anything claiming to be a human 
102 See infi'a Section III.B. 
103 Id. 
uJ.l Id. 
105 Turner, supra note 86, at 504 ("The argument is that we can, in the absence of natural law, avoid 
sociological relativism through a re-interpretation of philosophical anthropology to assert an 
ontology of rights in the claim that human frailty is a universal feature of human existence."). 
106 See, e.g., Bronislaw Malinowski, The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis, 44 AM. 
J. Soc. 938, 949 (1939) ("Every cultural activity again is carried out through co-operation. This 
means that man has to obey mies of conduct: life in common, which is essential to co-operation, 
means sacrifices and joint effort, the harnessing of individual contributions and work to a 
common end, and the distribution of the results according to traditional claims. Life in close co-
operation-that is, propinquity--offers temptations as regards sex and property. Co-operation 
implies leadership, authority, and hierarchy, and these, primitive or civilized, introduce the strain 
of competitive vanity and rivalries in ambition. The mies of conduct which define duty and 
privilege, harness concupiscences and jealousies, and lay down the charter of the family, 
municipality, tribe, and of eve1y co-operative group, must therefore not only be known in every 
society, but they must be sanctioned-that is, provided with means of effective enforcement."). 
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universal should generally relate to those same broad interests rather than 
the more specialized problems arising in only a few forms of political 
organizations or modern economies (e.g., the right to paid vacations, the 
treatment of workers in industrial economies). Instead of defining human 
rights through top-down processes that favor the priorities of the 
powerful representatives at the table, they should be built up from the 
empirically identified experiences from the broadest possible sample of 
human societies. 
In the literature, this is sometimes called the Least Common 
Denominator [LCD] approach, '07 and is frequently associated with the 
work of Alison Dundes Renteln. 108 Noting that "to date negligible 
progress has been made in the direction of establishing that human rights 
are universal or even that certain moral principles are widely shared," 109 
Renteln devises a method recognizing the bounded diversity of cultures, 
one that seeks "homeomorphic equivalents" of proposed rights in each 
culture. 110 Reviewing the literature, she finds supp01i to propose the case 
of retribution as a candidate universal principle.''' By employing 
independent methods-ethnographic descriptions and tenets of major 
religious traditions, and case examples of blood money and the feud-
. .RS<n.t~lu.fedsjustifi.e.d .. in .. concluding . .thaL~.'all.cultures.ha:vt}.mechanisms 
which are intended to limit violence and to prevent needless killing." 112 
This result does not lead directly to the claim that a right against 
excessive punishment is a cross-cultural universal, but it does suppo1i a 
practical reliance on a preexisting indigenous ethos capable of providing 
"a foundation for human rights." In this instance, Renteln suggests that, 
Were we to hold a global referendum on international human rights, 
all societies, if they were to vote according to their own ideals, would 
See also ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 67 (1996) ("The universality of human 
rights ... is a direct consequence of the universality of the needs of agency among all human 
being."). 
107 See, e.g., MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL 
PLURALISM 31-32 (1972) ("Absolutes are fixed, and, as far as convention is concerned, are not 
admitted to have variation, to differ from culture to culture, from epoch to epoch. Universals, on 
the other hand, are those least common denominators to be extracted from the range of variation 
that all phenomena of the natural or cultural world manifest."). 
108 ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS 
RELATIVISM (1990). 
'
09 Id. at 95. 
"
0 Id. at 11. 
"' Id. at 95-96. 
"
2 Id. at 133. 
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unanimously favor certain standards.1 113l In particular, they would 
endorse the principle that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life" (Article 6(1 ), International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights). (This is not to say that they would subscribe to the other 
provisions of this article, e.g., the inherent right to life.) It would 
follow that they would also agree with Article 6(3) of the Covenant 
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, both of which condemn the arbitra1y deprivation of life 
that is genocide. Any form of killing which lacks justification, e.g., 
summary executions, would be conh·ary to the universal principle of 
retribution. In the absence of the prior wrong, no society tolerates 
killing. 114 
The general methodological conclusion is that "where it is 
possible to demonstrate acceptance of a moral principle or value by all 
cultures, it will be feasible to erect human-rights standards. The reality of 
universality depends on marshaling cross-cultural data."115 The benefits 
of the method is that through such efforts, human rights can be anchored 
"via cross-cultural universals, [making] the standards more likely to be 
accepted and taken seriously."116 
Granting that "[a]fter a century of ethnographic work, 
anthropologists believe that all societies have human rights 
··· · · pf0p5sittons;'' 117"tlre·I:;Cf)projectappears~feasible in theory :¥et not 
everyone is convinced about the legitimacy of the leap from local norms 
to universal human rights. Richard Wilson blithely opines that "Renteln 
makes a na'ive conflation of what is common and what is morally 
m Others have expressed the opinion that human rights could be identified by popular referendum. 
Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The Universality of Human Rights, 58-59 lNT'L COMM. JURISTS REV., 
Dec. 1997, at 105, 106 ("There is an irrefutable democratic test that confirms the concept of the 
universality of rights. It is a simple matter. Just ask any human being: Would you like to live or 
be killed? Would you like to be tortured or enslaved? Would you like to live freely or in 
bondage? Would you like to have a say in how you are governed? If there is any critic of 
universality who would argue that an individual would choose execution to life, and bondage or 
serfdom to freedom, let him or her come faith. The democratic test of universality is, in our 
view, the basis for its strongest affimrntion.") As with most polls, the outcome would be a 
function of the wording. The options are rarely as polarized as suggested in this excerpt. 
Moreover, most people agreeing that they'd rather be rich than poor does not make wealth a 
human right. 
114 RENTELN, supra note 108, at 136. 
115 Id. at 135. 
116 Id. at 138-39. 
117 Theodore E. Downing, Human Rights Research: The Challenge for Anthropologist, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND ANTHROPOLOGY 9, 10 (Theodore E. Downing & Gilbert Kushner eds., 1988). 
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justifiable." 118 Presumably, if most world societies believe that 
infanticide is acceptable, then that practice satisfies Renteln's criterion to 
be deemed a human right. But her case study proposes no such 
mechanical cranking through the ethnographic literature blind to the 
moral implications of custom. She begins with general statements she 
already has reason to believe are "morally justifiable." The only problem 
is to see if their geographic dispersion is sufficiently wide to wan-ant 
recognition as human universals, and thereby human rights. 
A more substantive critique is offered by Rhoda Howard: 
To seek an anthropologically based consensus on rights by surveying 
all known human cultures ... is to confuse the concepts of rights, 
dignity, and justice. One can find affinities, analogues, and 
precedents for the actual content of internationally accepted human 
rights in many religious and cultural (geographic and national) 
traditions, but the actual concept of human rights ... is particular and 
modern, and representing a radical rupture from the status-based, 
nonegalitarian, and hierarchical societies of the past and present.119 
While all societies may not have independently arrived at the abstract 
notion of generic humanness (the names by which many societies call 
... t~:~~:'..!.~~8,: f~i,: .. ~~~~Ele,, ......... t~~1.1~l~!e, )£ ...... 1,!l;e,~1?: . '.'J:!!e, f e,gpJe,.'.:,12~)) .. Jh!l,! ..  
observation does not speak to the primary point. The question is not 
whether all groups recognize that eve1y person merits the protections of 
human rights; the concern here is that when the demands to comply with 
human rights are brought to them, that they see reflected in these rules 
the values they already hold. In that way, as Renteln says, "the standards 
are more likely to be accepted and taken seriously." While the LCD 
method will not prove the cross-cultural salience of the concept of the 
human right, it does provide an empirical foundation upon which to 
argue that a specific right reflects broad values. 
What Renteln's account does not state explicitly, but which the 
present argument would support, is the stronger claim that without the 
demonstrated acceptance of at least the broadest formulation of the value 
118 Richard A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introductio11, in HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CULTURE & CONTEXT, ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 7 (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997). The 
criticism misses its mark. Renteln is responding to the argument that human rights are universal, 
and reasonably argues that, if that is true, they must indeed be, in some sense, "common." If that 
were not true, then human rights are not universal and thus are not "human." 
119 Howard, supra note 46, at 81. 
120 See, e.g., Original Tribal Names of Native North American People, NATIVE LANGUAGES OF THE 
AM., http://www.native-languages.org/original.htm (last visited Jan. IO, 2017). For example, the 
Navajo called themselves Di11e'e, which in their tongue means "the people." Id. 
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at issue, the proposed right fails to qualify as a human right. Such a rnle 
should be rebuttably deemed a local civil right that has been exported 
and imposed upon alien societies often to the detriment of indigenous 
values. 
C. MANAGING CROSS-CULTURAL DISSENSUS 
Even if we optimistically find that all societies share norms such 
as Renteln's "retribution tied to proportionality," there will inevitably be 
disagreement over the triggering details. One group's standard to find the 
death penalty "proportional" may be much lower than another's, for 
example. Due to such variability, all groups will not reach the same 
substantive conclusions about the specifics of identified rights. Or, 
granting the right, there may still be strong disagreement over its 
appropriate bearers and objects. One society may view retribution to be a 
personal right, and others a prerogative of society. Divergence will be 
especially likely on propeiiy and family matters because, in addition to 
the usual work to organize society, these norms tend to define the 
essence of the group itself . 
.. .... ... . Resolution.of.disagre.ements, ... acc.ording to.AhdullahiAhm.edAn-
N a' im, should follow a process of exchanges which (like Raz) "accepts 
the existing international standards while seeking to enhance their 
cultural legitimacy within the major traditions of the world through 
internal dialogue and strnggle to establish enlightened perceptions and 
interpretations of cultural values and nonns." 121 He envisions, first, an 
"internal cultural discourse" in order to edge to the forefront existing 
values that better accord with established international standards,122 and 
then "cross-cultural dialogue" through which to compare the results of 
the prior process. 
To be effective, this discussion must be conducted in good faith. 
This means that the Western powers should "be open to a con-esponding 
121 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining Intemational 
Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Crne/, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, ill HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 
19, 21 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992). 
122 "My thesis does not assume that all individuals or groups within a society hold identical views 
on the meaning and implications of cultural values and norms, or that they would therefore share 
the same evaluation of the legitimacy of human rights standards. On the contrary, I assume and 
rely on the fact that there are either actual or potential differences in perceptions and 
interpretations of cultural values and norms." Id. at 20. 
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inducement in relation to their own attitudes and must also be respectful 
of the integrity of the other culture." 123 The present regime assumes that 
the practices and norms of the West set the standard that others must 
strive to emulate. According to An-Na'im it may be the West that needs 
to change its practices in favor of something favored by others. For the 
call to human rights to be legitimate, they cannot be "something that 
Americans .... take to others without allowing human rights advocates 
from other countries to intervene here."124 
Under this plan, the dialogues will yield rules upon which parties 
can agree, and which offer more guidance on behavioral norms than the 
abstract principles that emerge during LCD distillation. An-Na'im 
appears to be open to some irreducible remainder of cultural diversity 
that cannot be mapped onto the existing legal regime. Even when 
agreeing, for example, upon a standard against cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment, the specifics of what would be thus forbidden 
"should be determined by the moral standards of that society." 125 
Invoking a comparison that may strike many today as more controversial 
than when he first offered it, An-Na'im suggests that: 
For example, a North American may think that a short term of 
·············· r1n:j36sonmenr1;;·me· appl'oiJffaleiJunisnmeiirr0r:·f11ett;·ancC\vlsll Hiat ···· 
to be the universal punishment for this offense. A Muslim, on the 
other hand, may feel that the amputation of the hand is appropriate 
under certain conditions and after satisfying strict safeguards. It 
would be instructive for the North American to consider how she or 
he would feel if the Muslim punishment were made the norm. Most 
Western human rights advocates are likely to have a lingering feeling 
that there is simply no comparison between these two punishments 
because the Islamic punishment is "obviously" cruel and inhuman 
and should never compete with imprisonment as a possible 
punishment for this offense. A Muslim might respond by saying that 
this feeling is a product of Western ethnocentricity. 126 
123 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, l11trod11ctio11 to HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 1, 5 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na 'im ed., 1992). 
124 Laura Nader, lntrod11ctio11: Registers of Power, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING 
LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 117, 119 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry 
eds., 2007). 
12s Id. 
126 Id. at 38. Another example of the hidden ethnocentricity that can filter how we perceive the 
appropriateness of certain acts is offered by Carneiro da Cunha: "In the sixteenth century, 
Portuguese colonial authorities blamed the Tupi Indians along the Brazilian coast for 
ceremonially killing and eating their enemies instead of killing them on the battle field or 
enslaving them 'as all civilized countries do."' Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, Custom Is Not a 
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Missing from the Western reaction is the recognition that the "religiously 
sanctioned punishment ... will absolve an offender from punishment in 
the next life because God does not punish twice for the same offense," 127 
as well as an awareness of how some regard imprisonment as an extreme 
and cruel punishment. John Stuart Mill argued that imprisonment was 
worse than capital punishment. 128 More recently, sociologist Peter 
Moskos has challenged anyone forced to choose between five years in 
prison and ten vicious lashes to not opt for the latter. 129 The cruelty of 
imprisonment becomes even less controversial when the damaging 
effects of solitary confinement-a common practice in U.S. penal 
systems 130- are taken into account. 131 Perhaps for similar reasons, within 
many traditional societies "imprisonment as a form of punishment was 
almost unknown."132 
Thing, It Is a Path: Reflections 011 the Brazilian Indian Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 276, 293 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im 
ed., 1992). 
127 Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 35 . 
• • •.•• •• 
1.~.8, .•.. John-Stuart--MiU, .• r:;;apitaJRw1ish111e11J, ... (2.J. . .ApiciJ, •. 11368), .. jJI, IHE .. COLLECJE.Q .. .\:YO.Jl,K,.s .. 0£ .. J.o.im. 
STUART MILL, VOLUME XXVIII - PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES PART I NOVEMBER 
1850 - NOVEMBER 1868 (John M. Robson & Bruce L. Kinzer eds., 1988), 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/262#Mi11_0223-28_621 ("What comparison can there really be, in 
point of severity, between consigning a man to the short pang of a rapid death, and immuring 
him in a living tomb, there to linger out what may be a long life in the hardest and most 
monotonous toil, without any of its alleviations or rewards--debarred from all pleasant sights 
and sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope, except a slight mitigation of bodily restraint, or a 
small improvement of diet?"). 
129 PETER MOSKOS, IN DEFENSE OF FLOGGING 2 (2013) ("Think about it: five years hard time or ten 
lashes on the behind? You'd probably choose flogging. Wouldn't we all?"). 
130 ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE 
HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND JAILS, 2011-12 (2015) ("Nearly 20% of prison inmates and 18% 
of jail inmates had spent time in restrictive housing, including disciplinary segregation, 
administrative segregation [largely nonpunitive ], or solitary confinement [involving isolation and 
little out-of-cell time], in the past 12 months or since coming to their current facility, if 
shorter."). 
131 Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solifal)' Co11fi11e111e11t, 22 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL 'y 325, 
333 (2006) ("[F]or many of the inmates so housed, incarceration in solitary caused either severe 
exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance of an acute mental illness in 
individuals who had previously been free of any such illness."). The U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Torture has called solitmy confinement for persons under eighteen "cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment [that] violates article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
miicle 16 of the Convention against Torture." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, GROWING UP 
LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES 74--75 (2012), https://www.hnv.org/sites/default/files/repmis/usl 012ForUpload.pdf. 
132 T.O. Elias, Traditional Forms of Public Participation in Social Defence, 27 lNT'L REV. CRIM. 
POL'Y 18 (1969). 
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Against this background, the scales are not "obviously" in favor 
of the West's preferred treatment of the thief. The argument by the 
Muslim that amputation is more merciful than imprisonment becomes 
less radical, just as incarceration may not be as enlightened as often 
assumed. Arguably, imprisonment could be the more crnel and inhuman, 
not least because it exposes the thief "to what the offender will suffer in 
the next life should the religious punishment not be enforced in this 
life. " 133 This perspective may be insurmountably difficult for the 
Westerner to credit, but that is precisely the point. If one takes religion 
seriously-as the secular West typically does not134-then the priority is 
clear. 135 Societies with different hierarchies of values, though, will reach 
different conclusions. An-Na'im states there must be room for both, 
because neither is obviously wrong and each lifeway is the source of 
meaning for its paiiicipants. 136 
Such emotionally charged examples demonstrate that what many 
Westerners believe to be obviously immoral can be more nuanced. The 
proposed dialogues, however, can shed greater light on what is at stake. 
What the West may see as barbaric retribution that could be easily 
updated with fines or prisons, may resist overt revision due to its 
.. emb.~.dde.dn.es,s .. jn .. n.a .... c:;oherent ..... religious ... and ... existential .. context..N.When 
change occurs, it will not come from demands from outsiders that 
denigrate the sincere convictions of a people; indeed, such efforts are 
133 Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 35. 
134 Only 53% of Americans in 2014 stated they thought their religious beliefs were "very 
important," down from 56% in 2007. Importance of Religious in One's Life, PEW RES. CTR, 
http://www.pewfornm.org/religious-landscape-study/importance-of-religion-in-ones-life/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2017). See Press Release, Gallop International, Losing Our Religion? Two 
Thirds of People Still Claim to be Religious (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.wingia.com/en/news/losing_ our _religion_ two _thirds_ of _people_ still_ claim _to_ be _r 
eligious/290/ (offering a broader perspective) ("The research discovered that the most religious 
regions are Africa and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) where 86% and 82% respectively 
of the people consider themselves to be religious, ... Western Europe (51%) and Oceania (49%) 
are the only regions where approximately half of the population are either not religious or 
convinced atheist."). 
135 More could be said on this example, especially in light of the current negative reactions against 
Islamic culture. Westerners may insist that intervention in such situations is exactly the purpose 
of human rights laws. Yet it certainly should make a difference in that decision whether the thief 
views the amputation as wrong generally, or only as applied in his case. The former provides at 
least a prima facie opening for a human rights argument, but not the latter. For an example of one 
man explaining why he willingly submitted to have his hand amputated, see INSIDE A SHARI' AH 
COURT, (Films Media Group 2007) (seg. 44:14). 
u• Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 24 ("Enlightened ethnocentricity would therefore concede 
the right of others to be 'different,' whether as members of another society or as individuals 
within the same society."). 
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likely to result in a renewed commitment to the rule as a show of 
independence and group solidarity. Any positive refonn will likely be 
through exercise of what Max Gluckman identified as the inherent 
ambiguity of all legal rules. While giving the appearance of stability, the 
application of rules can prove quite malleable. 137 Thus, while remaining a 
formal penalty the amputation may, like the Judea-Christian's mandate 
to kill homosexuals, 138 eventually become a never-enforced outdated 
aiiifact. 139 But that transition must come from within, not under duress. 
It is in this light we see how An-Na'im's plan is incomplete. As 
a consequence of the embedded effects of cultural learning, 140 
disagreements over specific rights are unlikely to be resolved easily 
because changes may be tantamount to erasure of group self-identity. For 
that reason, the dialogues he requires are vulnerable to becoming locked. 
Each side will view its own preferences as "natural" and "self-evident," 
not sufficiently arbitraiy to be open to negotiation much less discard. 
Without a means to resolve this dialogic impasse, the project is 
prone to collapse into the current system in which disagreements are 
resolved in favor of those better able to impose their viewpoints through 
economic or military persuasions. Demands under threat of censure from 
~;ic\S£IDf:J1ttmY~!"§Jl§ILfil!tl:\!1§Qf s!iWYtt:If:§()J!li,i()lJ. m:e igf~ri91: t() ()Ile t]1a~ 
frames the reasons for change in terms of local values. If, for example, a 
human rights nonn emerges against capital punishment, the rule can be 
strengthened by linking it to a society's existing values promoting 
137 MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 326 
(1955) ("The varied flexibility of the key concepts of Lozi law and ethics is one of their 
attributes as instruments of argument. It enables the law to cover various situations and to 
develop so that it can accommodate social change. In this way the law in general is channeled 
through law in action to cover the infinite variety of situations in social life. Each legal ruling is 
united to its situation of dispute: it is stated in terms of fixed principles."). See also Stephen 
Sedley, Human Rights: A Twenty-First Centlll)' Agenda, 1995 PUB. L. 386, 387 (1995) ("Law 
spends its life stretched on the rack between certainty and adaptability, sometimes groaning 
audibly but mostly maintaining the stoical appearance of steady unifonnity which public 
confidence demands. But lest the mask become the face, it is important that new generations of 
lawyers should become actively curious about why the certainties of the law themselves change 
constantly."). 
138 Leviticus 20: 13 ("If a man has sexual relations with a man as one does with a woman, both of 
them have done what is detestable. They are to be put to death; their blood will be on their own 
heads."). 
139 INSIDE A SHARI'AH COURT, supra note 135, at 45:38 ("In Gusau prison no one is currently 
waiting to have their hand cut off. I was told that in other states they're sent to prison for a few 
years to await the amputation and then quietly released."). 
140 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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redemption and discouraging vengeance than through rebukes and 
accusations of savagery from foreign powers. 
D. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
The description of the human rights bureaucracy highlights its 
top-down procedures with formal organizations articulating what shall be 
the human rights. These conclusions are then evangelized outward, often 
resulting in attempts to instruct peoples about their rights, not 
infrequently against their will. The limitations of the human rights 
system, and the anthropological realities outlined earlier, suggest the 
following amendments to the ways in which candidate human rights are 
identified. The proposal satisfies Waldron's hope for a compromise 
between the umesolved search for abstract foundations and the pragmatic 
acceptance of the current legal regime. 
Step 1: Determine the Cross-Cultural LCD 
The LCD technique modeled by Renteln should be employed to identifo 
···· ... . what .. no1qns·peoples·Pecognize:fi'om4he··hPoadesF·.r<:tngeofeultural·· · 
contexts possible. 
Selecting the investigatory staiiing point is important. Renteln 
already had in hand a hypothetical rule-the proportionality of 
punishment-when she began her review. The sources of these initial 
statements can vary, but they are likely to include various versions of 
existing ethical, moral, and religious standards. The LCD process, 
therefore, is not a de nova inqui1y, but uses the outputs of other 
procedures as inputs for its own examination, verification, and when 
needed, restatement of general rules of conduct. 
Results from the LCD survey will be mapped onto the rules of 
international law. Those finding matches would be the most prototypical 
of the human rights. 
In the mapping we are not looking for direct correspondences. 
Renteln does not require that there be a one-to-one relationship, but only 
that there be enough of an overlap such that the formal rule can be linked 
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to preexisting values with or without the assistance of bridging 
notions. 141 
The LCD goal is that an identified human right be capable of 
recognition within local value systems. 142 Cunent rights that cannot be 
associated with LCD norms should be reevaluated for their suitability as 
human rights. Demotion from the status of human right does not require 
that the goal be abandoned. In keeping with Raz's concern to distinguish 
rights and values, failure to be a right means only that the norm should 
be advanced through other channels, by other arguments. 
Step 2: Resolve Cross-Cultural Disagreement through Dialogue 
Although An-Na'im offers his cross-cultural legitimacy 
approach as an alternative to the LCD method for creating consensus on 
the catalog of human rights, 143 his own description assumes the existence 
of that foundation: "despite their apparent peculiarities and diversity, 
human beings and societies ,share certain fundamental interests, concerns, 
qualities, traits, and values that can be identified and articulated as the 
framework for a common 'culture' of universal human rights."144 
.Thei:efore, .. ratheLJha1L.an .a.ltemaJi:x:e, .. hi§ ... JJ1J1JhQdJ1hm1Jd .. J'lt:L.f!PRJ.i~cl. .. tg 
further refine the norms identified through the LCD method and mapped 
onto the current rules. 
In the likely eventuality that the LCD method ident(fies disparate 
versions of a focal norm, the variability of normative opinions must be 
reasonably resolved before the mapping onto current rules can occur. 
Through dialogue a consensus emerges that adequately captures the 
range of opinion. 145 
141 Cf Griffin, supra note 42, at 557 ("[F]or a pair of values to be commensurable in this sense, 
there must be a bridging notion in terms of which the comparison between them can be made."). 
142 Cf MERRY, supra note 96, at I (2006) ("In order for human rights ideas to be effective, however, 
they need to be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and 
meaning."). 
143 See Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 21. ("Instead of being content with the existing least 
common denominator, I propose to broaden and deepen universal consensus on the formulation 
and implementation of human rights through internal reinterpretation of, and cross-cultural 
dialogue about, the meaning and implications of basic human values and norms."). 
144 Id. 
145 Some may object that seeking to find a single position on a value does a disservice to the 
complex multivocality associated with such important issues. That is hue, but at least now the 
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This process may not always be feasible within large 
heterogeneous groups but can be effective in smaller indigenous societies 
whose voice An-Na'im hopes to capture. 
After the mapping of norms fi'om multiple societies, the resulting list may 
display considerable variety. The final step looks to ascertain whether 
the range reflects only reasonable variation of the existing rule, or 
whether it contains substantive differences. In the latter situation a new 
semantic center must be sought, in which case the current rule will need 
to be revised or replaced. 
While the Step 1 itemization of the LCD is a comparatively 
straightforward empirical question (what do people believe and value, 
and how does this comport with actual behaviors), the second step 
involves finding consensus among competing alternatives. An-Na'im 
does not describe how such conversations would proceed. From the 
earlier discussion of the psychology of enculturated norms we can expect 
that when two societies differ on a fundamental value they will not easily 
relinquish their own traditional ways of life. This resistance is not always 
out of stubbornness or political gamesmanship. Necessarily the focus is 
·· 0n··tnehas1c····:varues 0reacli society,····s1giiificanf ··clianges···1ii :Whicil····c;ali··· 
threaten the coherence of the group's understanding of itself and its place 
in the world. Because all parties are instinctively protective of their 
fundamental values, talks could quickly become frozen as each merely 
reasserts the self-evident reasonableness of its own position. 
To increase the likelihood of productive outcomes, the process 
requires an external standard whereby some choices can be judged more 
acceptable than others because they better respect even more basic values 
or because they make other desired outcomes more likely. That standard 
must be shared by all societies, otherwise its introduction risks merely 
pushing back the impasse. Such a standard may not mechanically 
determine the debate's outcome, but it could beneficially provide a 
shared vocabulary for the conversation so that incommensurable 
positions can be considered from a new perspective. An-Na'im's 
proposal sparks optimism, but only to the extent that we are able to 
tentatively identify an evaluative standard that could fill this unique role. 
uniform mle is one rooted in the local reality, rather than the transplanted mle that was enacted 
without their input. 
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To find a suitable candidate by which to evaluate the proposed 
human rights, recall the anecdote mentioned earlier from the drafting 
history of the UDHR. Disparate countries were able to agree on the list 
of human rights only because they did not discuss why they supported 
those decisions. 146 It can be argued-in a version of the LCD analysis-
that each delegate found the items acceptable (or at least not wholly 
objectionable) because they compmied with what would on balance be 
equitable or fair for their interests. They got at least as much as they 
gave, and on the points that they lost, nothing central was sacrificed. 
Conceived in these familiar economic terms, in-esolvable philosophical 
differences could be avoided and result in a good bargain. The UDHR 
passed the United Nations General Assembly with only seven 
abstentions. 147 If this rendering accurately captures the underlying 
motivations that made the UDHR possible, then our intrinsic judgments 
on whether a specific situation is "fair" may be able to serve as the 
independent standard required to make An-Na'im's cross-cultural 
dialogues productive. 
IV. FAIRNESS: A SHARED INTUITION148 
For cross-cultural dialogues on fundamental values to produce a 
consensus position, an independent standard that can impartially critique 
or rank the options will be necessaiy. To do its work, the standard must 
exist in all societies, otherwise its use would reintroduce the 
disagreement over basic values it was intended to resolve. 
One possibility that at least has the required morphology is the 
intuition regarding fairness. A sense of fairness is possessed by all 
humans and represents perhaps the most elemental of our moral 
judgments. Ethological, 149 ethnological, 150 and human developmental 
146 See discussion supra Section H.B. See also ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 126 ("[C]reating a human 
rights treaty would be virtually impossible if discussions of theory and metaphysics were 
permitted at the drafting table"). 
147 GLENDON, supra note 91, at 162. 
148 Many ideas in this section are developed in more detail by Donovan. See James M. Donovan, 
Reciprocity as a Species of Fairness: Completing Malinowski's The01y of Law, in BRONISLAW 
MALINOWSKI'S CONCEPT OF LAW (Mateusz Sh;pien ed., 2016); James M. Donovan, Half-Baked: 
The Demand by For-Profit Businesses for Religious Exemptions from Selling to Same-Sex 
Couples, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (2016). 
149 E.g., Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297 (2003); 
Sarah Brosnan, Nonhuman Species' Reactions to Inequity and Their Implications for Fairness, 
19 Soc. JUST. RES. 153 (2006). 
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studies 151 ove1whelmingly point to the conclusion that the ability to 
notice an inequitable distribution of resources is deeply rooted in the 
evolutionary histories of all cooperative species, including Homo 
sapiens. Such results support a conclusion that fairness evaluations are a 
human universal. While some disagreement across cultures about what is 
"fair" would not be impossible, 152 since the categmy itself is already 
shared, the assessment can serve as a common metric against which to 
conduct the cross-cultural dialogues that An-Na'im envisioned. 
A. ANATURALHISTORYOFFAIRNESS 
In order to determine whether fairness can serve in the needed 
role of tie-breaker, we must attempt a firmer grasp of what it means to 
describe an arrangement as "fair." 
For some, fairness may be a synonym for justice, in which case 
the claim here appears circular. Human rights are creatures of the law, 
and thus serve the interests of international justice. Disagreements over 
human rights cannot be resolved by appeal to the same principles being 
argued over. But excepting the limited circumstances described by 
Rawls?s.0riginal·c0nditi0n;···behind·thevei:lof·ignorance;!~}.justice·i~not 
usually fairness. In some casual uses they are loosely interchangeable, 
yet in principle justice and fairness promote different ends. 
Among the world's cultures the distinction between the two 
concepts is widely recognized. As Gluckman found, justice is often what 
150 Using versions of the Ultimatum Game, fieldworkers have demonstrated that fairness 
determinations are present in all societies. While the results show cultural variability on how 
fairness is defined, "this variation coffelates with differences in patterns of interaction found in 
everyday life." Joseph Heinrich et al., I11troductio11 and Guide to the Volume to FOUNDATIONS OF 
HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN 
SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES 5 (Joseph Heinrich et al. eds., 2004). 
151 "The reaction of children to perceived unfairness shows how deeply seated these sentiments are, 
and the egalitarianism of hunter-gatherers suggests its long history." FRANS DEW AAL, THE AGE 
OF EMPATHY 184 (2009). 
152 Heinrich et al., supra note 55, at 49-50 ("We summarize our results as follows. First, the 
selfishness axiom is not supported in any society studied, and the canonical model fails in a 
variety of new ways. Second, there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups 
than had been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic 
organization and the degree of Market Integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral 
variation across societies .... ; Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic variables do 
not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the experiments is 
generally consistent with economic patterns of evetyday life in these societies. "). 
153 See John RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT (2001). 
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we wish for our enemies, while fairness is what we hope for ourselves. 154 
In this rudimentary sense, justice refers to the coldly impartial 
application of general rules, while fairness attends generously to the 
specific facts of a particular conflict. 155 Justice is blind; fairness notices 
the things we care about. 
Although both justice and fairness play similar roles within 
systems of dispute resolution, even here they differ qualitatively. Justice 
takes the short view, demanding that the scales be balanced immediately; 
fairness tends toward the long view, taking note of how the parties will 
need to maintain relationships in the future. Justice is a non-iterative 
exchange between strangers, while fairness allows for a short-tenn 
imbalance in light of long-term interests of an ongoing relationship. 156 
The basis for an idea of fairness is given through its roots in 
market economics. "Fair" in this view refers to the primaiy experience of 
entitlement and desert from ownership and exchange. This is the innate 
sense of knowing how much grain to give in exchange for some cattle. 
At some point the traders will agree on a given amount as being 
acceptable to both-otherwise one or the other will walk away and find a 
new partner. That mutually agreeable price we describe as fair, meaning 
. onethatFsatisfiesrboth.bargainexs .... 
Underlying the process is an understanding that the grain is 
"mine" and the cattle is "yours," and that neither of us can take what 
belongs to the other without his agreement. Without those boundaries, 
there does not exist sufficient distinction between us to make the 
exchange possible. Once the distinction between self and other has been 
acquired in this core sense, the rudirnentaiy ideas of entitlement and 
desert built out of tangible property for exchange-of recognizing what 
is mine, and that I control its disposition and can command a price to 
154 GLUCKMAN, supra note 137, at 55 ("Matters of property-rights, contract or injury in pennanent 
multiplex relationships require reconciliation; the same matters between strangers do not."). 
155 The tension between the two can be plainly illustrated in the disagreement about the correct 
outcome in Fuller's hypothetical of "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers." Should the trapped 
cave explorers be convicted of murder after cannibalizing their companion in order to survive, or 
should the extreme circumstances of the act serve as an excuse? Justice argues for the strict 
application of the formal rule against the willful taking of another's life; fairness advocates a 
more lenient judgment due to the special circumstances in which the defendants found 
themselves. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
156 Cf. Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd Jr., Introduction: The Disputing Process to THE DISPUTING 
PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 13 (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd Jr. eds., 1978) 
("Relationships that are multiplex and involve many interests demand ce11ain kinds of 
settlement, such as compromise, which will allow the relations to continue."). 
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surrender that control-can be analogically extended to other kinds of 
prope1iy, both real and metaphorical. This foundation is preserved in the 
background awareness of a right as an entitlement, as something that one 
is owed by another. 
The analogic economic foundations of self and property suffice 
to explain why I believe that I have rights whose transgression I describe 
as unfair. Further steps, however, are required to account for the 
recognition that others besides myself are entitled to this same respect. 
As noted earlier, human rights as a distinct category of thought emerged 
in the eighteenth century in documents such as the US Bill of Rights and 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Lynn Hunt 
connects these events with a sea-change of psychological perspective 
that arose from the rise of popular reading of novels and other literature. 
Reading accounts of torture or epistolaty novels had physical effects 
that translated into brain changes and came back out as new concepts 
about the organization of social and political life. New kinds of 
reading (and viewing and listening) created new individual 
experiences (empathy), which in tum made possible new social and 
political concepts (human rights). 157 
:While her defense.Qf this .thesiS···iS···GOJ:Telatio11al, later research ·has feund ···· · 
the relationship she describes between reading, brain activity, and 
empathetic imagining. 158 
157 HUNT, supra note 21, at 33-34. Martha Nussbaum makes a similar argument. Symposium, 
Martha Nussbaum, Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism, 22 PHIL. & 
LITERATURE 343, 354 (1998) ("And, following Rousseau, I insisted that where our society has 
created sharp hierarchical separations we may well fail to have compassion for those on the other 
side of the barrier. Just as Rousseau's kings found it difficult to see their lot in the suffering of a 
peasant, so too we should expect Nazis to experience great difficulty in seeing their own 
possibilities in the sufferings of a Jew. I argue that literary works can help us cross these barriers, 
if they display the person on the other side of the barrier in a certain way, as a human being 
worthy of sympathy."). See also Turner, supra note 86, at 506 ("Ultimately my argument has to 
assume that sympathy is also a consequence of, or a supplement to, human frailty. Human beings 
will want their rights to be recognized because they see in the plight of others their own 
[possible] misery."). 
158 E.g., Gregory S. Berns et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of a Novel on Connectivity in the 
Brain, 3 BRAIN CONNEeTIVJTY 590 (2013); David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading 
LitermJ' Fiction Improves TheolJ' of Mind, 342 Ser. 377 (2013). Keith Oatley offers a summary 
of this literature, from which he concludes that "engaging with fiction is fundamentally helpful 
in enabling us to understand each other as human beings," which can explain the increase in 
empathy that has had, as "[ o ]ne of its consequences [the] acknowledgement of the rights of other 
people, even when these others belong to different cultures." Keith Oatley, Fiction: Simulation of 
Social Worlds, 20 TRENDS Coo. Ser. 618, 626 (2016). In this vein, similar reports describing the 
changes in brain functioning arising from use of the internet bode ill for the long term prospects 
for the ability to empathize with the situations of others, and thus for the concern with human 
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This hypothesis fits well with the observations of well-placed 
practitioners. Andrew Chapman, having served for many years as the 
representative of Amnesty International to the United Nations, suggests 
that "the real seeds of the human rights movement [are] a feeling of 
sympathy for the distress of others, coupled with a sense of injustice 
when governments resort to measures which invade the perceived natural 
rights of the individual. " 159 
For this description, Chapman perhaps relies upon philosopher 
Richard Rorty, who, believing like Raz that foundationalist projects are 
outmoded, argues that "the emergence of the human rights culture seems 
to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing 
sad and sentimental stories."160 Rorty asserts that "the work of changing 
moral intuitions"-toward the end of expanding recognition and respect 
for fundamental human rights-"is being done by manipulating our 
feelings rather than by increasing our knowledge" about what rights 
"are" in the foundationalist sense. The Syrian refugee plight, for 
example, was largely ignored until attention was sparked by the image of 
a boy who drowned trying to reach safety in Greece. 161 We should 
therefore "concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on 
..... senti!.uental .. ~ducatiQJi'.Jg ... b.~tt.1<.:cju~rng§~ .... ~x~xY@~.~.§ .... QR~llD~§s,Jq.h.11.mil.11 .... 
rights claims. 162 
As an empirical matter, this account suggests that the idea of 
universal human rights will be most prevalent in contexts where private 
property ideologies predominate, and where the individual has emerged 
out of the social background as an entity of subjective awareness. 163 This 
rights generally. The same tool that reveals the shocking range of human rights violations blunts 
the edge of our caring. E.g., Daniel M. Wegner & Adrian F. Ward, How Google is Changing 
Your Brain, 309 Sci. AM. 58 (2013). 
159 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS; A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 9 (2007). 
160 Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in TRUTH AND PROGRESS 167, 
172, 176 (1998). 
161 Helena Smith, Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Re.fi1gees, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-
drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees. 
162 Rorty, supra note 160, at 176. 
163 According to Hegel, these achievements occurred simultaneously where they happen at all. 
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §40 (Allen W. Wood, ed., H.B. Nisbet 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) ("A person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates 
himself to another person, and indeed it is only as owners of property that they two have 
existence [Dasein] for each other. Their identity in themselves acquires existence [Existenz] 
through the transference of the property of the one to the other by common will and with due 
respect of the rights of both-that is, by contract."). See also Turner, supra note 86, at 499 ("The 
concept of rights is thus still criticized on the grounds that there is no ontological foundations for 
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in fact appears to be the case: human rights are often accused of being a 
"Western" idea, as opposed to more communitarian Asian cultural 
models that have not prioritized ownership by individuals to the same 
extent. 164 The complaint against human rights as a Western ideal is not 
that the lineage is inconect, but that being Western alone makes it either 
right or appropriate for imposition on everyone else. 
The uneven distribution of the idea of universal human rights has 
been a fact retrospectively accounted for with varying success, often in 
ways unflattering to the societies that lack it. The present model, 
however, predicts that outcome in a way that does not disparage late-
comers as being in some way morally immature. But as the following 
section argues, it is not necessary that all societies have the idea of the 
universal human rights, but only that the relationships contained in those 
ideas reflect local values. Universal human rights can thus emerge out of 
an environment where all rights are local. 165 
B. THE FAIRNESS STANDARD IN PRACTICE 
To tum panhuman intuitions into a referee for human rights 
. dialogues, iti.s necessary to ... in.v:ert.the analysisrAlthough·the···literature···· 
speaks of fairness, what is being perceived are conditions of unfairness. 
claims about universality, that it is an individualistic concept of western (liberal) philosophy, and 
that it is covertly but inevitably tied to the idea of (private) property."). 
164 See William P. Alford, Making a Goddess of Democracy from Loose Sand: Thoughts 011 Human 
Rights in the People's Republic of China, in HUMAN RIGHTS JN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 65, 70 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) 
("[T]he centrality in Chinese society of the notion that individuals derived meaning in life 
through their membership in an intricate web of social relationships, rather than chiefly on their 
own or in a solitary nexus with a higher authority."). 
165 The emphasis on seeking consensus to identify hnman rights may lead some to object that if one 
society declines to recognize a right, then that right cannot be a human right lacking as it would 
the requisite universality. It permits, in other words, a heckler's veto on the identification of any 
human right, and given the diversity of human societies renders unlikely that any right may attain 
this status. 
A possible response to the problem of the heckler's veto draws attention specifically to the locus 
of the relevant fairness evaluations. The social recognition required is not what the right-
bestowers grant to others, but what they demand for themselves. Fairness is, at its root, an 
assessment of comparative conditions between one's self and another, and thus we should not be 
distracted by abstract statements that posit absolute states without reference to the expectations 
of the framers. If, for example, we wish to consider whether a right qualifies as a human right, 
and find that a power-wielding majority in a society granted itself this right but withheld it from 
members of other minorities, in our cross-cultural comparison it would be upon the former 
allowances to the self and not the deprivations from others that we should focus. 
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"Our instances of 'unfairness' seem to be much clearer, sharper, and 
more concrete than the more abstract, aerial notions of 'fairness. "'166 
This simple fact has profound implications for the identification 
of human lights. First, given that "[ w ]hereas human happiness is noted 
for its variety, human misery is relatively uniform," 167 greater success 
will likely be found in achieving consensus on rights that seek to prevent 
evils rather than on promote goods. 168 This practical limitation reflects 
back to the original impetus for the human rights project, the crimes of 
the Second World War. Given the elusiveness of the idea of the human 
right, Hunt suggests that the only sure way to know "that a human right 
is at issue [is] when we feel hon-ified by its violation." 169 Raz, it seems, 
had a valid point when he favored limiting human rights to those 
violations which would provoke interventions. He failed, though, to 
clearly describe his argument's inevitable conclusions concerning what 
kinds of violations those are likely to be. To the extent human rights are 
intended to create a better world, they would do this by eliminating the 
worst evils, not by promoting utopian ideals. 170 Human rights are the 
floor beneath which state actions cannot sink, not a ceiling toward which 
governments must aspire. These higher goals should be the commitment 
.... ofJoQ.J:JJlJ:'. .~JlfQn;;~(.t.Qixilxigbt§.Jf1Y~ §~~k.th~ .. gr~.~t~§tJ!!1191J!1t()f c;rQ§§: 
cultural agreement, human rights should be framed as negatives: what 
must not be done, rather than as affirmations of what should be done. 
We have indirectly seen the practical con-ectness of limiting 
human rights to the prevention of harms. Tln·ee efforts to cross-culturally 
identify and justify rules of human rights have all been framed as 
targeting the worst of human actions. Renteln used as the example to test 
her LCD analysis the rule of retribution tied to proportionality. An-
166 NORMAN J. FINKEL, NOT FAIR!: THE TYPOLOGY OF COMMONSENSE UNFAIRNESS xiii (2001 ). 
167 This observation has a long pedigree. See Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context: 
Introduction, supra note 118, at 5. See, e.g., BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON THE 
CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON CERTAIN PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEM 1-2 (1972) 
("Ifhnman beings find it difficult to agree upon the meaning and causes of happiness, they find it 
much easier to know when they are miserable."). But see LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA I 
(Henri Troyat trans., Mod. Library, 2000) ("Happy families are all alike; eve1y unhappy family is 
unhappy in its own way."). 
168 Cf Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 133, 155 
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992) ("[H]uman rights should be aimed at avoiding great 
evils, at what Falk described as 'the intolerable,' not at achieving great goods."). 
169 HUNT, supra note 21, at 26. 
170 E.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 7-8 ("Humanitarians should abandon the utopian aspirations of 
human rights law for the hard-won truths of development economics."). 
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Na'im examined the expectation that "no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 171 
Handwerker performed a similar study to defend the proposition that 
"[f]reedom from violence stands as an important candidate for a 
universal human right." 172 To imagine a credible alternative phrased as 
positive entitlements is not impossible, but these efforts typically come 
not from those looking at the aiTay of actual peoples but from scholars 
such as philosophers working in the abstract. 173 
Some may wony that restricting human rights to negative 
limitations would deprive many groups of affirmative protections they 
require. For example, Article 2 of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities174 states that: 
Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) 
have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, 
freely and without interference or any fonn of discrimination. 
Under the proposal, minorities would arguably lose these rights. 
·It may be possible torephrase1:hem;····however, <rs ··negatives:·· Note; for····· 
171 Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 29. 
172 W. Penn Handwerker, Universal Human Rights and the Problem of Unbounded Cultural 
Meanings, 99 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 799 (1997). 
173 E.g., WILLIAM J. TALBOTT, WHICH RIGHTS SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL? (2005). Talbott identifies as 
the nine basic rights: 
I. a right to physical security 
2. a right to physical subsistence (understood as a right to an opportunity to earn 
subsistence for those who are able to do so) 
3. children's rights to what is necessary for normal physical, cognitive, emotional, 
and behavioral development, including the development of empathic 
understanding 
4. a right to an education, including a moral education aimed at further 
development and use of empathic understanding 
5. a right to freedom of the press 
6. a right to freedom of thought and expression 
7. a right to freedom of association 
8. a right to a sphere of personal autonomy free from paternalistic interference 
9. political rights, including democratic rights and an independent judiciary to 
enforce the entire package ofrights./d. at 178. 
174 G.A. Res. 47/135, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Dec. 18, 1992). 
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example, that the list of rights offered by Rawls 175 can be easily defined 
as rules against interference rather than guarantees of enjoyment. The 
Article 2 language can be similarly restated: 
Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities shall not have their enjoyment of their own culture, 
profession and practice of their own religion, and use of their own 
language interfered with. 
The versions admittedly are not functional equivalents. 
Depending upon one's theory of rights, 176 especially employing 
Hohfeldian analysis, 177 the original rule suggests that in order for 
minorities to exercise these rights someone must have a correlative duty. 
Recall that this discussion began with Wasserstrom's definition, which 
states that human rights are "assertable, in a manner of speaking, 'against 
the whole world. "'178 Given a right to use a minority language, the state 
arguably has a duty to provide programs that encourage and preserve that 
right and thus make enjoyment possible. The negative version implies 
that if a minority uses its own language, the state may not discourage that 
use-as has been done by the United States 179 and other countries-but 
neither is it obliged to intervene to foster its flourishing so that future 
··· ··· meinber'sof'tlreminorttycarr errjoythe·sameprivitege·:··· 
Reframing important positive rights into negative protections in 
most cases would preserve the principle interest behind the rule while 
demanding less from the state. Many of a libe1tarian bent would 
welcome such a structural limitation on the powers of government to 
intervene in the ordinaiy lives of its citizens, even under the banner of 
promoting their general welfare. The primary benefit, though, is that 
these are the principles most likely to achieve cross-cultural consensus. If 
we are serious that human rights should reflect the priorities and interests 
of diverse societies, limiting the category to negative prohibitions 
appears the best approach. 
175 RAWLS, supra note 59, at 65. 
176 See Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/, for a general review of theories of rights, including 
Hohfeldian analysis. 
177 See Wesley HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter w. Cook ed., 1919). 
178 Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 632. 
179 In one example in its past, the United States banned the Hawaiian language in schools in 1896 
soon after it wrest control of the kingdom from the native rulers. 1896 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 57. 
Sec. 30. 
Vol. 34, No. 3 From Legal Transplants to Fair Translation 531 
If human rights are limited to the universe of prohibitions that 
must never be broken, the second practical outcome of the proposed 
method is that, at the end, there will be few human rights. Several 
authors, including Mary Ann Glendon180 and Eric Posner, 181 have spoken 
in this vein, urging that human rights are too many, too common, and 
that as a result their invocation has become insipid and mundane. 182 Some 
scholars view a restricted number of recognized human rights as a 
reductio ad absurdum by which to criticize the effmi to derive human 
rights from human nature. 183 An-Na'im pointed to this critique as a 
weakness of the least common denominator method. 184 Still, the one 
point on which both Raz and Waldron seem to agree is that the growing 
menu of asserted rights is unlikely to fall within any sustainable or 
credible justification for the category. The present discussion endorses 
180 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE xi 
( 1991) ("A rapidly expanding catalog of rights-extending to trees, animals, smokers, 
nonsmokers, consumers, and so on-not only multiplies the occasions for collisions, but it risks 
trivializing core democratic values. A tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms 
of a clash of rights (a woman's right to her own body vs. a fetus's right to life) impedes 
oompromise;mutualunderstanding·;amhhediscovery·ofcomtn6tigf6tlnd:''):····· 
181 POSNER, supra note 4, at 137-138 ("Give priority to a nan-ow set of rights ... This approach is a 
dead end because the relevant rights-enforcers cannot agree that a specific subset of rights are 
fundamental while the others are not."). See also Steven Lukes, Five Fables about Human 
Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993 19, 38 (Stephen Shute & 
Susan Hurley eds., 1993) ("[T]he list of human rights should be kept both reasonably short and 
reasonably abstract."). 
182 WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 178-179 (2004) ("So-called 
'minimalist' approaches are perhaps motivated by the won-y that human rights discourse seems 
to be on its way to becoming "a club too heavy to lift." As rights claims proliferate, the language 
of human rights takes on unnecessary and unwieldy baggage of both nonnative and metaethical 
kinds. Added normative baggage consists in the fact that with each additional generation of 
rights consensus is left farther and fa1iher behind ... When human rights claims are expanded 
beyond the reach of consensus, not only is the expansion likely to fail to win any effective 
advantage for the putative right-holders, but the very language ofrights is debased in a way that 
enfeebles protections even for consensus first-generation rights." 
183 See, e.g., BEITZ, supra note 38, at 4-5 ("An extreme version of this type of skepticism holds that 
nothing 'called a human right can be derived from human nature' because the behavioral 
dispositions we actually observe in human beings are too diverse and conflicting to allow for any 
coherent generalization. A more moderate position holds that the interests that are in fact shared 
by all human beings are too few to provide a foundation for any but the most elemental 
prohibitions-for example, of murder, torture, severe material deprivation . . . The result of 
accepting this idea is not a wholesale skepticism about human rights but rather a skepticism 
about international human rights doctrine as it exists today: its scope will appear to extend well 
beyond what might reasonably be seen as rights belonging to human beings 'as such.')" 
184 See Ahmed An-Na'im, supra note 121, at 25 ("[T]he existing least common denominator may 
not be enough to accommodate certain vital human rights. This fact would suggest the need to 
broaden and deepen common values to support these human rights."). 
532 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
that conclusion, and provides a rationale in its support. A small number 
of human rights will be the necessary outcome of the described process, 
and not an arbitrary nonnative limit. 
The unfairness standard would be employed whenever 
discussants prove intractable over alternative versions of a norm. The 
different proposals should be evaluated on the degree to which they are 
perceived as unfair. That assessment will not be automatic or necessarily 
conclusive, but it does provide a different dimension for consideration. 
Because all peoples innately calculate the unfairness of a given situation, 
all that is needed is a good faith effort to reach the best outcome, even 
when that is not one's own. 185 
Invocation of background fairness considerations would allow 
one side to yield on contentious points while preserving its primary 
moral principles. Yielding would not come from losing the argument or 
adopting a foreign value, but because the change in view compo1ied with 
already accepted values. The spread of human rights principles under this 
view is not a patronizing evangelical missionizing, but more a Platonic 
dialogue like the Meno, wherein we are led to discover convictions we 
already hold. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the motives to propose a universal moral code reflect the 
best intentions, the project suffers from three shortcomings. First, it has 
failed to adequately address the reality of cultural diversity. The present 
international human rights law regime arguably favors normative 
preferences of the industrialized West that are not necessarily shared by 
all societies expected to conform to those standards. Second, the 
formalized human rights treaties have thus far been demonstrably 
underwhelming in their ability to compel recalcitrant states to reform 
their behaviors, and third, the uncontrolled growth in the number of 
human rights weakens the impact of appeals to that standard. 
Although previously treated as independent issues, this paper 
finds that these three limitations of the current approach to human rights 
are in fact sufficiently linked that a remedy to the first will 
simultaneously resolve the others. Paiis I and II describe how the 
185 One can imagine that fairness evaluations could productively be elicited through a Rawlsian 
thought exercise of applying each candidate rule to the original position, behind a veil of 
ignorance. 
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imposition of human rights values onto some societies may inflict 
unintended harms to the extent that they undermine the justification and 
support for human rights altogether. Against that background the 
challenge is to find ways to realize the goods of the human rights project 
without injuring those it intends to benefit. The goal is to build an 
understanding of human rights that reflects the norms of all humans and 
not a mere subset characterized by power and economic dominance. 
Those who despair of a viable solution may take this tension as 
reason to deny the reality or usefulness of human rights. Alasdair 
Macintyre, for example, has rejected the idea of human rights by 
pointing out that: 
The best reason for asserting ... that there are no [human] rights is 
indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess 
for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we 
possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give 
good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed. 186 
This judgment is ce1iainly pessimistic, and arguably premature. This 
paper offers reasons to believe that human rights can be a defensible 
categ01y when they meaningfully reflect the norms of most humans. 
Seetiofls IH and IV propose that 1.n orderto ·be 1.nitially categorized as a ···· 
human right, a candidate rule must have analogues in a broad ainy of 
societies as identified by the LCD analysis. Residual differences would 
be negotiated through cross-cultural dialogue with impasses resolved by 
appeal to good-faith comparisons of fair outcomes. 
This process would generate a list of rights that will be 
recognized by most cultures as being a reflection of their own values 
rather than imposed under threat by foreign powers. The expectation is 
that when societies regard the legal requirements as related to their own 
n01ms, treaty compliance will improve, thereby addressing the second 
shortcoming. This outcome is more likely because in order to achieve 
consensus the rules will predominantly refer to the things that 
governments must not do, on which most people agree, rather than on 
what they should aspire to achieve, on which much more disagreement 
exists. Finally, if the catalog of human rights is limited to rules on which 
most societies agree, and which are therefore most likely restricted to 
negative prohibitions, the number of recognized rights will be small. 
Fewer appeals to human rights will make any that do occur more 
186 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 67 (1981 ). 
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significant for signaling an exceptional and critical condition that must 
be promptly remedied. 
Rather than pondering ways to transpmi human rights ideals 
from their native environments into settings where they are seen as alien 
demands, the emphasis should be on translating the formal rules of 
human rights law into the vernacular of local values. This project has 
been at the center of work by Sally Engle Meny 
Translation requires three kinds of changes in the fonn and 
presentation of human rights ideas and institutions. First, they need to 
be framed in images, symbols, naiTatives, and religious or secular 
language that resonate with the local community .... Second, they 
need to be tailored to the structural conditions of the place where they 
are deployed, including its economic, political, and kinship 
systems .... Third, the target population needs to be defined. 187 
Through the method described, international human rights~once they 
have been designed to reflect the consensual norms of the world's 
diverse societies~can in turn be translated into local idioms, rather than 
transplanted as an alien invasive species of values. 
187 MERRY, supra note 96, at 220. 
